



Record No. 2:090 
In the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
at Richmond 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTCMOBILE 
INSURANCE COMPAN~ : 
v. 
ANNA L. WRIGHT 
F ROl\1 TII.E CIRCUI T COURT OI~ PRJ~('ESS AS} E COUNTY. 
''The briefs shall be printed in type not lt:ss in size than 
small pica, and shall be nine inches in length and six inches 
in width, so as to conform in dimensions to the printed 
records along with which they are to be bo llnd, in accord-
ance with Act of Assembly, approved March 1, 1903; and 
the clerks of this court are directed not to 1 eceive or file a 
brief not conforming in all respects to the aforementioned 
reqnirements." 
The foregoi ng is p r inted in small pica type fo r the infor-
mation of counsel. 
M. B. WA TTS, Cl erk. 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
Record No. 2090 
S.TATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
ANNA L. WRIGHT, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF ERROR. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Supreme Co'ltrt of Appeals 
of Virginia: 
Your petitioner respectfully shows unto yo:ur Honors that 
it is aggrieved by a judgment entered on the 6th day of July, 
.1938, by the Circuit Court of the County of Princess Anne, 
·Virginia, in favor of Anna ~· vyright .against 
1
your petitioner 
for the sum of $2,703.50, With Interest and cof5ts. The tran-
script of the record, together with the original exhibits in the 
case, are herewith presented. : · 
The petition is adopted as the opening brief, and a copy 
was delivered to counsel for AnnaL. Wright on the 26th day 
of September, 1938. 
Oral argument on this petition is requested. 
.· 
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FACTS. 
This is an action brought by notice of motion for judgment 
to enforce against the State Farm :1\'Iutual Automobile 
2* Insurance Company a judgment "'.:theretofore obtained 
by Anna L. Wright ag·ainst one Nelson Smith. Nelson 
Smith was the son-in-la'v of Anna L. Wright, and owned and 
operated an automobi.Ie, and also carried casualty insurance 
with the State Farm ~Iutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany. Both 1\1rs. vVright and ~Ir. Smith lived at Virginia 
Beach, Virginia .. On November 3, 1934, lVIrs. Wright had 
been brought to Norfolk and was being· carried back to Vir-
ginia Beach by 1\llr. Smith in his machine, and on the way 
back his machine collided "rith a truck which was being op-
erated by E. L. Swain and Edward :S'vain. Suit was insti-
tuted on behalf of Mrs. Wright against the Swains and 
against Nelson Smith, and a trial 'vas had in the Circuit Court 
of Princess Anne County, Virginia, in which trial the jury 
exonerated the4S,vains, but found a verdict for the plaintiff 
against the def.cndant Nelson Smith in the sum of $2,500.00. 
Counsel for Nelson Smith moved the court to set aside the 
verdict as to the defendant Smith, and at a later date, after 
argument, the court set aside the said verdict and entered 
judgment for the defendant. To this action of the court coun-
sel excepted, obtained a 'vrit of error to this Honorable Court, 
and after the presentation of the case the court rendered an 
opinion reversing· the order of the lower court, setting aside 
the judgment as entered in favor of the defendant Smith, and 
upon the facts reinstating· the verdict of the jury in favor of 
Anna L. V\Trig4t. This decision is reported in 168 Va. 315; 
191 S. E. 611. 
Following the entry of the judgment against Nelson Smith, 
execution was issued thereon and returned "no effects". 
Under the terms of the policy here sued upon the State 
Farm 1\futual Automobile Insurance .Company was obligated 
to defend Nelson Smith in the above mentioned litigation. 
See Exhibit H, Section 2 of Part II. During the investiga-
tion of the matter certain facts were ascertained which n1ade 
it doubtful us to whether there was any coverage for this 
3* particular accident *under the policy. Thereupon a non-
'vaiver agreement 'vas executed by Nelson Smith, the as-
~ured, which appears as defendant's Exhibit # 1. The 
Insurance company then proceeded to furnish to the de 
fendant Smith counsel for the defense of the action brought 
by lVlrs. Wright, and these counsel appeared not only in the 
lower court, but in the case on appeal, and took all proper 
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positions to safeguard the rights of Nelson' Smith in that 
litigation. - · 
When the present suit came on for trial we, ·
1
acting as coun-
sel for the State Farm 1\Iutual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany, offered testimony to show that Mrs. Wrlght at the time 
of the accident was being carried as a passenger for a con-
sideration, thus bringing the case· within one of the exceptive 
provisions of the policy. Evidence was also offered to show 
that Mrs. Wright was a member of the household of Nelson 
Smith, this also coming within an exceptive provision of the 
policy. As to the first point of transportation for considera-
tion, the Judge held that the status of the parties had already 
been fixed in the action brought by Anna L. Wright against 
Swain and Smith, and therefore ruled out that evidence and 
refused the instruction tendered by defendant covering that 
particular point. The question of being· a member of the 
family was left for the jury to pass upon,, and the jury 
promptly found that l\£rs. Wright was not a member of the 
household of Nelson Smith and therefore entitled to recover 
from the insurance company. 
ASSIGNlVIENTS OF ERROR. 
1. The court erred in rejecting the testimony offered by the 
defendant to establish the fact that plaintiff was being trans-
ported for a consideration at the time of the accident. 
4* *2. The court erred in holding that the status of the 
plaintiff was ~res adjudicata as to this defendant. 
3. The court erred in refusing defendant's instruction No. 
2 (R., pp. 36 and 37). 
4. The court erred in not setting aside the verdict of the 
jury and entering judgment for. the defendant' especially un-· 
der the evidence that plaintiff 'vas a member of the household 




1. The Plaintiff, Anna L. Wright, Was B'eing Transpo1·ted 
for a Consideration, and the Court Shquld Have 
Allowed This Tpsti1nm111 to Be Intro1uced. 
· It needs no argument to justify the exception which these 
policies of insurance contain barring coverage in instances 
where persons are being carried for a consideration. The 
difference in risk and the abuse to which it mt lead are too 
well known f:tnd have been commented upon oo frequently 
for us to discuss these at length here. It is s ;1fficient tQ say 
I 
I 
4 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
that the terms of policy conform to the requirements of our 
own insurance s ta.ndards in Virginia, and courts will not seek 
to change, enlarge or din1inish the rig·hts of the parties under 
ihat contract, but will enforce the contract as entered into. 
The provision of the policy which is here under discussion is 
as follows: 
( 1) Purposes of Use Defined. The term ''Pleasure and 
Business'' means personal pleasure and family use including 
business calls, and does not include, and the policy does not 
cov-er: "\Vhen there is renting or livery use of the automobile, 
or while anyone is being carried for a consideration, unless 
it is otherwise expressly stated on page 1 of this Policy, or 
set out in written endorsement hereto attached and an addi-
tional premiun1 is paid therefor. 
5* «·The question to be determined, therefore is did this 
accident happen "'vhile anyone is being carried for a 
consideration'' 1 It will be ascertained from an inspection of 
the policy filed as Exhibit If that there is no memorandum 
upon the policy or endorsen1ent showing that any additional 
premium is paid for this particular risk, so that we have the 
very sin1ple question of consideration. 
:i\frs. Anna L. vVrig·ht, during the orig·inal investigation of 
the claim, had signed a full statenwnt explaining exactly the 
conditions under which she was riding in Smith's automobile. 
Being called to the stand, she was asked about the contents 
of this statement (R., p. 20), to which counsel for plaintiff ob-
jected. The reason for the objection at that time, however, 
'vas an hnpropor one, so that the examination continued, and 
l\irs. \\Tright was asked first to read the statmuent in full and 
then to state whether or not the details of that statement 
were correct. "\Vith .the exception of certain expressions con-
cerning her living with :.Mr. Smith as a. member of his house-
hold, l\tlrs. vVright aclo1o·wlcdg-ed that the statements were 
correct (R., p. 23). This statement was filed as defendant's 
Exhibit #2 in the evidence, but upon counsel's objection 
the court would not allow defendant's counsel to read to the 
jury any of the statement that bore upon the question of con-
sideration and limited the statement before the jury merely 
to those portions which dealt with the question of being a 
mCinber of J\IIr. Smith's household. The discussion upon this 
begins at pag·e 30 of the Record and continues throug·h to 
page 35. 
The statement filed as Exhibit 2, which contains the evi-
dence offered by defendant, is as follows :-
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STATElVIENT OF 1\fRS. W. J. WRIGHT. 
I 
I, 
Suffolk, V a., ~{arch 13, 1935. 
During the winter months of 1932 and 1933 1\ir. and 1\frs. 
Nelson Smith lived at the Hicks Cottag·e, at Va. Beach, Va. 
I was staying with then1 most of_ that time. About April, 
6* 1933, *I opened my cottage on 17th St., Va. Beach, Va., 
and 1\tfr. and J\.Irs. Smith can1e to live with me. We had an· 
arrangement whereby lVIr. and ~irs. Sn1ith 'vere to live with 
me and help with the house work. 1\tirs. Smith was to take 
care of the arrangements made with the- guests and to assist 
generally. lVIr. Smith was to help in the kitchen, to do the 
carving and to go to the market. In addition thereto it was 
understood that I would have the use of their car, and that 
they 'vould drive it, or if they 'vere not there the colored boy 
or my other d·aughter l{a.therine would drive the car. The 
usual charge for board at Va. Beach is from $20.00 to $25.00 
per 'vk. "\Ve agreed that 1\fr. and 1\Irs. Smith were to pay me 
the sum of $25.00 each per month. This reduced rate was in 
consideration for the assistance rendered by !vir. and ~Irs. 
Smith and also for the use of their car. This same arrange-
ment has continued to date, and we will have the arrange-
ment for next summer. In 1934 ~fr. and 1£rs. Sn1ith left my 
cottage about October 15th and 1noved into the Traymore 
Apartment. I went to live with then1 about one week later. 
The arrangement regarding 1\{r. and 1\frs. Smith continued 
after 've went to the Traymore apartment, because there was 
plumbing and carpenter work to be done before the cottage · 
could be closed. 1\!Ir. and J\frs. Smith were to help me in clos-
ing·_ the cottage. Two or three days before November 3, 1934, 
I told 1\fr. Smith I wanted hhn to take n1e to Norfolk. I wanted 
to go to the plumber to purchase some bowls and to see lVIr. 
Rudolph, my landlord, regarding· payments on the rental of 
the cottage. I told hin1 I would like to go in Saturday. He 
said he would take nw. vV e reached Norfolk a~out 11 A. 1L 
I got out of the car on Church St. 1\fr. Smith ~filet me about 
5 P. M. in front of Smith and \Velton's on Gra:nby St., Nor-
folk, Va. We drove on out to the Va. Beach. ~~vd. We h.ad 
traveled out the Va. Beach Blvd. about four nnles. 1\fr. Sm1th 
was driving about 35 1niles per hour. I sa\v the 1truck that we 
were about to pass, and the next thing I noticed \Vas that I 
felt the crash. I was sitting on the rear seat l~ft-hand side. 
I was rendered unconscious by the impact, and the next I re-
membered I was being lifted out of the car window. 
MRS. W. J. virn.IGHT. 
1: 
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Defendant's contention upon this point is that this evi-
dence shows conclusively that :Nirs. Wright was being trans-
ported for a consideration and is not res adj~ttdicata in the 
present action. 
As will be seen from the discussion at pages 30 to 35, in-
clusive, of the record, the court belo\V held that because the 
plaintiff in the first case had sued as a guest, and because 
7* at the hearing· defense counsel insisted *upon a trial un-
der the pleadings as there drawn, that such trial estab-
lished the status of plaintiff as a guest in the car, and there-
fore the fact of consideration' could ·not now be brought out 
between the present parties. To begin with, the lower court 
seems to h.ave lost sight of the reason why the first case was 
tried upon the theory of gross negligence rather than ordi-
nary negligence, although in the orig·ina.l case the Judge him-
self was the one to point out the reason consideration could 
not be shown. As exhibits in the present case, pages 46, 47, 
49, 50, 64, 65, 66, 67 and 68 of the original record in Wright v. 
Swain (JJJtd 81nith were introduced in evidence. It appears 
from this record that at this first trial counsel for plaintiff 
attempted to introduce evidence himself to show that 11:rs. 
vVright was being carried as a passenger for a consideration, 
to which counser for Sn1ith objected, for the reason that plain-
tiff had alleged an action based upon the doctrine- of gross 
negligence, and that during the trial he could not offer testi-
mony to show a different relation and a different degree of 
care upon which plaintiff might recover. In other \vords, 
counsel for Sn1ith sought to hold plaintiff to her pleadings, 
, w)lich necessitated her showing a much higher degree of care 
upon the part of defendant and a breach of that duty before 
she could recover, whereas if plaintiff had been allowed to 
alter her position during the trial and show that she was a 
passenger for hire, then she would be able to recover for any 
slight act of negligence. The court itself called attention to 
the difference quite emphatically as follows: 
"By the Court: There is no contractlJ.al relation alleged 
in the notice of motion, and no mention of contractual rela-
tion in the bill of particulars. Ho'v do you expect a recovery 
on a contract if you don't allege it?" (R., p. 48). 
This is again emphasized at page 51, in which the court re-
minds counsel that if he had desired to recover for simple 
8* negligence under some *contractual relationship, ''then 
· you should have alleged it in your notice: of motion.'' 
(R., p. 51). The issue, therefore, which was submitted to the 
jury in the first case was not whether the plaintiff was riding 
I 
c, •i 
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as a guest or as a passenger, but was limited to the question 
of gross negligence under the pleadings. By a'ireading of t4e 
opinion Qf the Sunreme Court of Appeals abdve referred to 
it will be seen that this question 'vas not discussed or com-
mented upon. The case had been tried in the lower court on 
the theory of plaintiff that she was a guest, and the question 
before the appellate court was whether or not the Judge in the 
lower court was within his rights in setting aside the verdict 
for plaintiff and entering judgment for the defendant on the 
question of gross negligence. There. was no point of the two 
issues being submitted, and this was never passed upon either 
by the jury in the lower court or by the Supreme Court on 
appeal. Certainly the act of the Judge in reft1sing to allow 
plaintiff to prove her contract for transportation in the first 
case was not an adjudication of 'vhether the ~vidence would 
sustain it, but was a decision that under the :allegations as 
made in that case it should not be considered at all. Counsel 
for plaintiff may have had it in n1ind that he desired to take 
advantage of the relationship which existed between the 
parties, and counsel for plaintiff knew the contents of the 
statement which had been m.ade by :1\frs. Wright, but counsel 
by his' own pleading precluded the trial of the issue which is 
involved in this present proceeding. 
One of the cardinal principles of the application of the plea 
of res adjudicata is that the action is betw~en the same 
parties. The first action was between ~irs. vVright as plain-
tiff and the drivers of the truck and of the automobile as de-
fendants, and was based upon the question ·of neg·ligence. 
9* '"'That action sounded in tort. The present proceeding is 
on~ in contract between 1\frs. Wrig·ht as plaintiff and thn 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company as de- . 
fendant, in which she seeks to miforce the provisions of a con-
tract of insurance, and the question of neglig·ence is not in-
volved, the parties are entirely different, the nature of the 
proceeding is different, and in such a proceeding the defend-
ant has the right to show that any of the conditions or restric-
tions of its policy have not been fulfilled. i 
The Supreme Court of Appeals in its decision referred to 
above succinctly stated the issue which was prdsented in the 
former case as follows: ·. I 
I 
"The court submitted to the jury the issue of whether or 
not Nelson Smith was guilty of gross negligence under the 
circumstances. .As we have already stated, the· jury decided 
that issue adversely to him, but the court refused to sustain 
the verdict and held as a matter of law that th~1 .. evidence did not warrant a finding of gross negligence. If ithe evidence . ! 
I 
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'vas not sufficient to sustain a finding of gross negligence 
ag·ainst 1\fr. Snrith, then it follows that the trial court prop-
erly sustained his n1otion a~1d set aside the verdict.'' 
191 S. E., at page 612, 168 Va. at p. 317. 
Therefore, we find that the issue is different, the parties are 
different, and the nature of the proceeding is different. 
Dudng the argument of this question in the present pro-
ceeding (R., p. :34) the Judge pointed to the fact that the insur-
ance cmnpany had furnished counsel for the defense of ]\tfr. 
Smith in the forn1er case, and that as counsel for S1nith him-
self did not raise the question of contractual relationship, the 
insurance con1pany is now estopped to plead the exception 
in its policy as a defense, saying·: ''And counsel in the other 
case defended it as a guest case, and it seems to 1nc now you 
are estopped to con1e in and blow hot and blo'v cold.'' The 
learned court, evidently in its enthusiasm over the case, 
10* obviously overlooked *the obligation placed upon coun-
sel. In the first case counsel were to defend Smith ac-
cording to the pleadings, not to defend the insurance com-
pany, which was not a party to the cause, and certainly their 
professional Rtanding called upon them to see that Smith's 
case 'vas tried according to the pleadings which he was called 
to answer. lfad they disregarded this duty which rested 
upon then1, and instead of raising valid objections upon 
Sn1ith 's behalf, they had waived such an objection in order 
to establish 'a defense to be used by the insurance company in 
son1B later proceeding, then surely their conduct would have 
been subject to justifiable comment. The situation was not 
one of blowing hot and blowing cold, but was one of protect· 
ing different rig·hts of different parties in this proceeding. 
Counsel in the first proceeding were in no sense representing 
the insurance company in defending· a claim under its con-
tract; they were defending Nelson Smith to the best of their 
ability, and their duty required them to see that no issue was 
submitted to the jury that was not raised in the pleadings. 
Lloyd v. N. <f; Til'. Ry. Co., 151 Va. 415; 145 S. E., at 374. 
In this connection we call attention to the non-waiver agree-
ment 'vhich was executed by the assured, and which was in-
troduced in evidence in this case as defendant's Exhibit No. 
2, whereby the insurance company, in furnishing defense for 
Smith, 'vaived none of its rights under its policy. We do not 
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nishes another complete answer to the po~tion taken by 
.plaintiff. i 
Nor can there be any doubt under the above quoted evi-
dence which was excluded by tlie court that lV..&s. Wright was 
being carried for a consideration at the time. 
In considering this point about consideration, let us remem-
ber that in order to sustain it an actualcash fare paid 
11 * for a ride is not necessary. *If the evidence shows that 
there was an agreement between the parties whereby 
one party is to be furnished transportation, and that certain 
acts are to be performed in consideration thereof, that is suf-
ficient to meet the requirements of the provision in the policy., 
This is aptly stated in the case of TV estern Machinery Co. v. 
Bam.kl?{rs Indemnity Co., 68 Pac. (2d) 382, as :follows: 
"It is not necessary, in order to constitute one a passenger 
for hire, that there be a money consideration fo;r the carriage; 
. it being sufficient that some benefit, or advantage, or profit, 
shall inure to the carrier." 
In view of this principle we direct. the court's attention to 
the evidence of Mrs. Wright, the plaintiff, as to the use of 
Smith's car. In the first place, both J\fr. and ~Irs. Smith were 
to assist in the performance of certain duties· at the board-
ing house operated by l\£rs. Wright at Virginia Beach. In 
addition to these duties it' was understood that Mrs. Wright 
was to have the use of Smith's car, and that they (either Mr. 
or Mrs. Smith) would· drive it, or the colored boy,. or Mrs. 
vVright's other daughter. These services rendered by Mr. 
and ~.frs. Smith, together "\\l-ith the· use. of the car, would make 
up for the difference in the amount of board which they 
should pay at the cottage. The usual cha1~ge for board is 
from $20.00 to $25.00 per w·eek, but in vie'v of the a hove cir-
cumstances 7\Ir. and 1\Irs. Smith were to pay only the sum of 
$25.00 each per month. And note the specific statement: 
"This reduced rate was in consideration for the assistance 
render-ed by lVIr. andl\Irs. Smith anll also for the ~tse of their 
car." The business upon which ~frs. vVright w\as engaged at 
the time of the accident 'vas in connection with; her boarding 
house. She had advised lVIr. Smith that she de!~ired to go to 
Norfolk to see the plumber and also her landlord, and Mr . 
.Smith complied with her request. We, therefore, have estab-
lished a definite agreement for the use of the car, a re-
12"' quest by Mrs. *Wright to be taken to Norfolk from Vir-
ginia Beach and a definite object at the time in connec-
tion with the operation of h-er boarding house.j Under these 
circumstances there can be no doubt of the fact that during 
i 
' ! 
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the continuation of that agreement, and especially at the 
time of the accident, M:rs. Wrig·ht was. being carried in the 
car as a passenger for a consideration. The courts have on 
numerous occasions in which the facts were nothing like as 
plain as in the present case declared the injur~d party a pas-
seng·er for consideration, and for illustrations, among others, 
we quote the following: 
The case of Duffy v. J. Tl'. BishotJ Co., (1923), 99 Conn. 573, 
122 Atl. 121, holds that where an agreement existed between 
a building contractor and a sub-contractor to transport the 
plaintiff, an ernployee of the sub-contractor, between a cer-
tain railroad station and the plaoo of plaintiff's 'vork, that 
the employee was not an invitee, but was a passenger for 
hire. 
Ward v. Bar·ringer (1931), 123 Ohio State 565, 176 N. E. 
217, holds that a plaintiff, riding with a garage owner to the 
place on the highway ·where the plaintiff's automobile had 
stalled, "ras a passenger for hire. 
In Rogers v. Price (1924), 117 l{an. 181, 230 Pac. 1047, the 
defendant nwtor truck owner agTeed to transport plaintiff's 
household goods for $35.00, or if the plaintiff and his wife 
w·ould go along· and help load and unload, for $80.00. Court 
held plaintiff and his wife were passengers for hire. 
,] aclcson v. Queen (1926), 257 l\iass. 515, 154 N. E. 78, holds 
that where the defendant requested the plaintiff purchaser to 
·go along with the truck and help load and unload, such trans-
portation was for the defendant's pecuniary benefit and 
plaintiff became a passenger for hire. 
In Brookha-rt v. G·reenleas-Lied IJf otor Co. (1932) 
13')1< (la.), 244 N. 1N. *721, the plaintiff was a prospective 
purchaser riding in the defendant's autOinobile which 
was being detuonstrated to hin1. The court asked the ques-
tion of 'vhether or not the plaintiff could possibly be consid-
ered a passenger for hire. It then proceeds to ans'\ver the 
question by stating· that he is rendered value received for his 
trapsportation when he accepts a ride within such automo-
bile. The court 'vent on to hold the plaintiff a passenger 
furhl~ · 
The case of Royal Finan.ce Co1npany of California v. Mille1· 
(1931), 47 Fed. (2d), 24, holds that a prospective purchaser · 
of real estate riding in an auton1obile furnished by the real 
estate company while going out to view some sub-divisions 
was a passenger for hire. The same result was reached in 
Sullivan v. Richardso11t (1932), 119 Cal. App. 367, 6 Pac. (2) 
567. In neither of these cases was there an actual compensa-
tion paid for the ride, the consideration consisting purely in 
i 
I 
State Farm Mut . .A.uto. Ins. Co. v. Anna :JL,. Wright. 11 
1 
the anticipation or possibility of a purchase! being made at 
some future time by the plaintiff. 1, 
In Loft~es v. Pelletier (1916), 223 Mass. 63, 111 N. E. 712, 
the plaintiff was a district nurse hired and paii! by a women's 
club to attend patients who could not afford a nurse. She was 
injured when defendant physician's neglig·ence caused the 
car in which she was riding to turn over. The court found 
that the plaintiff had an implied right to be . transported to 
the patient by the tern1s of her contract, and that she was re-
quired to accept such means of transportation that were of-
fered to her. From these findings the court declared that 
the plaintiff was a passenger for hire. . 
In Cross v. Kubel (1934), 315 Pa. 396, 172 Atl. 649, the 
defendant was a member of a basketball team which played 
a regular series of games with other teams in 'adjacent cities. 
The members of the team generally traveled to and from 
these games by bus or rail, theii' fares being paid out 
14~ *of a fund available for the purpose. : Occasionally, 
however, trips were made in cars owned by players. In 
instances 'vhere private cars were used the owner of the cal' 
was either paid an amount equivalent to bus fares or com-
pensated for the cost of oil and gasoline and given, in addition, 
a small amount for the use of the car.· .A.t the time the accident 
occurred there was one young· lady present who 'vas not a 
member of the team nor a paying passenger. The court held 
that the insurance policy did not cover the accident in question 
at all, either as to the members of the team or as to the young 
lady riding in the car. · 
In Dzia.dosc v . .A1nerican Casualty Co. (1934), 12 N. J. 
Misc. 205, 171 Atl. 137, it was held that where the defendant 
hauled a number of persons to and from work in considera-
tion of the payment of one dollar each per we-ek, which he ap-
plied towards gas and oil, such payme:n.t constituted a car-
riage for hire. · 1 
In view of the definite facts which ·we have here, and of the· · 
decisions of the courts in some,vha t similar ~ases, we con-
fidently maintain that Mrs. Wright at the time of the acci-
dent was riding as a passenger for a consideration; that this 
brings her within the exception of the policy~ and that as 
ag·ainst this defendant there can be·no recovery. 
Certainly counsel, by deliberate allegations i:in his plead-
ings in one suit in tort, cannot thereby precluqe another de-
fendant in a separate suit from sho,ving a valid defense un-
der a contract which was not at issue in the first suit. 
For an illuminating discussion of this question of carrying 
for a consideration, together with the reasons s\uj pporting the 
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see the opinion of Justice E·pes in the case of Cartos v. Hart-
ford Accide1~t & Inde11~nity ·co., 160 Va. 505; 169 S. E. at 597. 
15'"' *2. J.l1rs. TV·right fYas a 111entber of the Farnily of the As-
sured Residing in the Sanw Hou,sehold As the 
Assured. 
Parag·raph (3) of' the General Conditions in the said con-
tract of insurance provides as follo,·~ls : 
(3) The C01npany shall not be liable. Under Coverages 
A, B, C, D, E and F, for· (a) Loss or damage caused directly 
or indirectly by invasion, insurrection, riot, civil war or com-
nlotion, military, naval or usurped power, or by order of any 
civil authority; (b) Loss or damage by robes, 'vearing ap-
parel or personal effects; (c) Loss or damage, if either the 
title or interest of the Assured in the property be or become 
other than sole and unconditional ownership, unless plainly 
so disclosed on Page 1 of the Policy, or unless with the writ-
ten consent of the Company by endorsement hereto attached. 
Under Coverages D, E, F, G and H while the automobile is 
being driven in a race or speed contest, or by any person un-
der the age fixed by law, or fourteen (14) years in any event, 
or in violation of any state requirement for a driving license. 
Under Coverage G for bodily injury to any employee of the 
assured while engaged in the business of the Assured (other 
than domestic en1ployment) oi· in the operating, 1naintenan~e 
or repair of the auton1obile, or to any person to who~ the 
assured may he held liable under any vY orkmen 's Conlpensa-
tion Law, or to the Assured or any m.ernber of the fa1nily of 
the ass~wed residing in the sam.e household as the assured. 
Under Coverages G and I-I for any liability assumed by the 
Assured under oral or writt-en contract or agreement. Under 
Coverag·es D and E except 'vhile the described automobile is 
being opm,ated by the Assured, or a person lawfully in pos-
session thereof. Under Coverage H for property owned, 
rented, leased, in charge of, or transported by the Assured. 
Under Any Coverage while the automobile is used for any 
purpose other than is fully disclos-ed on Page 1 of the Policy 
or set out in written enclorsen1ent hereto attached or while 
used in any illicit or prohibited trade for transportation. 
This provision in the policy of insurance is the usual one 
and a reasonable one. The tendency has become very strong 
in recent years for one member of a family to sue another 
member of a family 'vhere insurance is involved, and, in or-
der to meet this unsatisfactory condition, companies have 
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found it necessary to embody some such clause in their con-
tracts. In the statement which was originally given by ~Irs. 
Wright it appeared that during the winter months of 1932 
and 1933 her daughter and son-in-law, ~Ir. and M~rs. 
16* *Nelson Smith, were living at Virginia Beach, and that 
she was staying with them most of that time. When 
1\:Irs. Wright opened her o'vn cottage in the spring of 1933 
then l\tir. and l\1rs. Smith went to live 'vith her under the ar-
rangmnent which has been outlined in the discussion preced-
ing this one. In the fall of 1934, J\IIr. and 1\:frs. Smith moved to 
the Traymore Apartment at the Beach, aug 1\:frs. Wright 
went to live 'vith them. At the trial j\:frs. "'VVright 'vent upon 
the stand, and while she adn1itted signing this statement in 
the presence of her attorney and her son-in-law, she attempted 
to qualify that portion of the statement with reference to liv-
ing· with the Smiths, and her testhnony upon this point is 
found especially at pages 22 and 23 of the record. Her coun-
sel, on cross examination, attempted to bring out that she ·was 
not dependent upon either of her daughters or son-in-law for 
a living, and that she visited with her other daug·hters at 
times. The fact is, however, that irrespective of her explana-
tion and attempted qualification of the statement 'vhich she. 
had given a long tilne previous to the trial, she was living 
with the Smiths in their apartment at ·virginia Beach and had 
expected to return to it. She was a n1ember of the family 
because 1\:Irs. S1nith 'vas her daughter. This issue 'vas sub-
mitted to the jury, and the jury, by its verdict, found that 
she was not a men1ber of the household of Nel~on Snlith~ and 
_the court refused to set aside the verdict. We respectfully 
suggest that the point became a question of law and that the 
court should have, upon the evidence, held that she was a 
member of the household and therefore came within the ex-
ceptive provision of the policy. 
17* '''A late case upon this question is that :of State Fann 
JJ!Iut . .A:uto. Ins. Co. v . .Jan~es, 70 Fed. (2d) 802, and we 
refer to the opinion of Judge Soper for a cleat discussion of 
the question and a collection of the authorities upon it. There 
the plaintiff in the case below, ~Iiss James, had l;>een a boarder 
in the home of the assured. She had lost he~ position~ but 
continued to spend about half of her time at tl~e hom.e of the 
assured and the other half at the home of her iparents. The 
court held that in vie'v of the circumstances ~urrounding a 
different relationship, and especially in view of the somewhat 
strict manner of vie,ving these claims, the plaintiff was, for 
the purposes of the exceptive clause in the policy, a Inember of 
the household of the assured, and that whatetcr l1er rig·hts 
may have been against the assured she was precluded from 
! 
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·recovering as against the insurance company under its policy. 
We take the liberty of quoting the following from Judge 
Soper's opinion : · 
If in accord with the general rule of interpretation the 
· meaning of the word ''household'' in the policy under con-
sideration is determined in the light of the situation in which 
it was used, there can be no doubt that it was intended to em-
brace such a person as the plaintiff in this case. Obviously 
the exception was intended to restrict the company's liability, . 
and the specific purpose was to safeguard the company against 
the ·natural and inevitable partiality of the assured to an in-
jured person if he should happen to be a member of the same 
family circle. This purpose, manifest to any reasonable per-
son, was well described in Cartier v .. Casualty Co., supra, 84 
, N. I-I. 526, page 528, 153 A. 6, 7, as follows: "In considering 
the purpose of the excepting clause of the policy it is clear 
enough that it was meant to avoid the insurer's liability to 
indemnify the injuries to members of the insured's house-
hold, whether or not he was its head. The natural tendency 
of one insured to strengthen or enlarge the evidence of lia-
bility to members of his household for accidents insured 
against increases the hazard of liability under the policy in 
such cases over that for accidents to others. Without actual 
dishonesty, the disposition to favor those close to one reflects 
itself in opinions and judgments, and one insured is more 
likely to concede by admission or nonresistance blame for 
hurting a n1ember of his household than for doing harms to 
others." 
18* *Another case discussing this same question and col-
lecting a number of authorities is that of Ocean Accident 
.& Guaranty Co. v. Schrnidt, 46 Fed. (2d) 269. The question 
involved there was whether or not the son who had given 
permission to another party to drive his father's car was a 
member of the household of the assured, and even though it 
was shown that the son was over twenty-one years of age and 
was not dependent upon his father for support, yet, in view 
of the language of the policy it was held that the son was a 
member of the household, and that therefore his permission 
was valid. And so in the prese~t case counsel for ~frs. Wrig·ht 
attempted to show that she was not dependent for her sup-
port upon her son-in-law, Nelson Smith, but this has nothing· . · 
whatever to do 'vith the determination of the point and is 
immaterial. The question is were the facts attending the 
mode of living_ as between }virs. Wright and her daughter 
and son-in-law such as to constitute a situation which insur-
I 
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ance companies have the right to guard themselves against 
We submit that their relations were such th~t Mrs. Wright 
should have been held as a matter of law to be a member of 
the household, and even though she may hav;e visited some 
of the other members of her family, and even though she may 
not have been dependent upon the assured for her support, 
yet the facts show very clearly that they were all a part of 
the same family. · 
. It will serve no good purpose to quote or cite any of the 
numerous cases upon this point, and we refer to the above two 
decisions especially and to the authorities which they cite and 
discuss. 
19~ *3. Judgnwnt Should Be Entered for the Defendant. 
The case comes to this court with the evidence set out in 
full as to both points in issue, and should the court approve 
either or both of these points w·e submit that it should enter 
judgment in favor of the insurance con1pany, the defendant 
below, and bring an end to the litigation. For instance, upon 
the point of consideration, as to which the Judg-e excluded 
the evidence from the jury, that evidence is incorporated in 
this record and is the evidence of 1I rs. Wright herself, the 
plaintiff, so that this court, if it decides, as 've contend it 
should, that the evidence is adrnissible, should enter judgn1e~t 
thereon in favor of the defendant insurance company without 
remanding the case for further proceeding. 
CONCLUSION. 
For the reasons heretofore stated and the errors herein-
above discussed, your petitioner prays that a writ of error 
and supersedeas be allowed in this case; that the judgn1ent 
and ruling- of the trial court mav be revie·wed and reversed 
and judgment entered herein by this Honorable 1
1
0. ourt for the 
defendant in accordance with the statutes in suqh cases made 
and provided, or that the said case be i·everse,d and a new 
trial gTanted. j-
. Respectfully submitted, 
STATE FARl\1: 1\:[UTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSUR.ANCE C01\1:P A~Y, 
By HUGI-IES, LITTLE & SEA WEL~L, 
Its Attorneys. 
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· 20* *I, Leon T. Seawell, an attorney at law practicing in 
.the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, hereby 
cettify that in n1y opinion it is proper that the decision in the 
above entitled action be reviewed and reversed by this Honor-
able Court. 
LEON T. SEA. WELL. 
Received Sept. 27, 1938. 
J. W. E. 
Writ of error and supersedeas granted. Bond.$4,500. 
JNO. W. EGGLESTON. 
Nov. 2, 1938. 
Received November 3, 1938. 
:M. B. W. 
RECO.RD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, 
on the 6th clay of July, 1938. · 
, Be It Remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: on the 14th day 
of ~.,ebruary, 1938, can1e the plaintiff, Anna L. Wright, and 
filed her Notice of lviotion against State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company, a foreign corporation in the 
words and figures following, to-wit: 
Anna L. Wright, Plaintiff, 
17. 
State Farm'~futual Automobile Insurance Company a foreign 
corporation, Defendant. 
NOTICE OF MOTION. 
To State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
· Bloomington, Illinois : · 
Take Notice : . That I, Anna L. Wright, shall on the 28th 
day of February, 1938, between the hours of Ten .A. M. and 
I 
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I 
One P. JYI., or as soon thereafter as it may be heard, move the 
Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, at the Court House 
thereof, for a judgment against State Far:m 1\iutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company, a foreig-n corpqration, for the 
sum of Two Thousand Five Hundred ($2,500~00) Dollars, in-
terest thereon at 6% per annum from the 29th day of Octo-
ber, 1935, until paid, and $203.51 Court costs recovered by the 
said Anna L. Wright against Nelson Sn1ith in an action at 
law in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, Virginia, 
l1ereinafter referred to, and the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia; and for this, to-wit: 
That prior to the 3rd day of November, 1934, 
page 2 ~ State F'arm ~lutual Automobile Insurance Company, 
a foreign corporation, through its duly authorized 
c·fficers, agents and representatives, for vahiable monetary 
considerations, entered into a certain insurance contract with 
Nelson Smith, of Virginia Beach, Virginia, to furnish and pro-
vide public liability insurance covering his Ford Sedan motor 
vehicle, motor and serial nun1ber V18-417045, and did, prior 
to the 3rd day of November, 19:34, issue in the name of Nelson 
Smith and delivered to the said Nelson Smith its certain 
policy of public liability insurance on said Ford Sedan motor 
vehicle, in which said insurance policy the said Nelson S1nith 
is designated and called "named assured", said policy of 
insurance being in full force and legal effect on, for son1e time, 
prior to, and some time subsequent to, the 3rd day of N ovem-
ber, 1934; 
That the said contract of public liability insurance pro-
vided, among other things, that from Septmnber 6th, 1934, to 
1\iarch 6th, 1935, to insure the assured, within the policy 
limits, to-wit: $10,000..00 for any one person killed or injured, 
against loss from a liability imposed by law upon the assured 
for damages on account of bodily injuries or ~ea th suffered 
or alleged to have been suffered by any person ~s the result of 
accidents occurring- within the United States ?r Canada, by 
reason of the ownership, maintenance, or usc1- of the afore-
said Ford motor vehicle, while the policy was in force; to 
defend in the name of the assured any suit ~ainst the as-
sured brought on account of any accident invoLVing personal 
injury covered by the policy; to pay all exp~nses incurred 
by the defendant irrespective of the policy li~ts in defend-
ing any suit brought against the assured, inclu~ng any Court 
costs taxed against the assured in any such proceeding and 
the interest accruing on that part of any judgment not in 
excess of the policy limits until the defendant bas paid, ten-
dered or depoeited in Court such part of suc1l judgm~nt as 
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does not exceed the limit of the defendant's lia-
- page 3 ~ bility thereon; the plaintiff files in the Clerk's Of-
fice of this Court the said policy of insurance upon 
which this action is brought at the time of filing· or docketing 
this notice of motion; 
That the "named assured", Nelson Smith, the assu~ed un-
der said insurance policy, performed all of the conditions of 
said policy that he should have performed, and has violated 
none of its prohibitions that would void the said policy con-
tract; · ' 
That wl1ile the said policy of insurance \Vas in full force 
and effect, 1.o-\vit: on the 3rd day of November, 1934, serious 
and pennanent bodily injuries were inflicted upon the Plain-
tiff in Princess .Anne County by ·reason of the use and op-
eration of the said Ford motor vehicle owned and driven by 
the said Nelson Smith; that he, the said Nelson Smith, was 
not covered or protected by any other insurance in this mat-
ter other than as covered under the aforesaid policy of in-
. surance; that Nelson Smith then and there, while so using 
and operating· said motor vehicle in Princess Anne County, 
Virginia, on and along the higlnvay leading from Norfolk to 
Virginia Beach, and proceeding in an Easterly direction along 
said highway, recklessly and with gross and culpable negli-
gence drove said motor vehicle over and across the left of 
the center line of said highway, and into, upon, ag·ainst a 
motor truck which was then and there turning into a driveway 
on the North side of the high,vay; and as a result of the reck-
lessness and gross and culpable negligence of the said N el-
son Sn1ith in the managmnent and control of said Ford motor 
vehicle, and as a proximate cause and result thereof the 
Plaintiff was seriously and permanently injured, maimed and 
disfigured for life; that thereupon, to-wit: on the 3rd day of 
November, 1934, the said Nelson Smith became liable to the 
Plaintiff for her damages and said bodily injuries, and that, 
likewise, on the 3rd day of November, 1934, liability for said 
damages and said bodily injuries of the Plaintiff 
page 4 ~ attached to the defendant as insurer under said pub-
lic liability insurance policy. 
That the Plaintiff heretofore, to-\vit: On the 20th day of 
~Iay, 1935, instituted an action by· way of Notice of Motion 
for Judgment against Nelson Smith and others in the Cir-
cuit Court of Princess Anne County, Virginia, to recover of 
the said Nelson Stnith and others $12,000.00 damag·es for her 
aforesaid bodily. injuries, and at a later date, to-wit: On the 
29th day of October, 1935, upon the trial of said action by a 
jury in said Court, a verdict was rendered in favor of the 
Plaintiff against Nelson Smith for the sum of $2,500.00, 
I 
I. 
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which verdict the said Court, on the 30th: day of April, 
1936, set aside and entered a judgnwnt for the said Nelson 
Sn1ith; that on appeal to the Suprmne Court of Appeals of 
Virginia, the said Supreme Court reversed -th~ decision of the 
Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, anq entered judg--
ment for the Plaintiff for the sum of $2,500.00, 'vith interest 
from the 29th day of October, 1935, and $203.'51 Court costs, 
which said judgment is final. 
That heretofore, to-wit: On the 3rd day of August, 1937, 
an execution or "rrit of fie~ri facias was sued out of the Clerk's 
Office of the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County, Virginia, 
on the aforesaid judg·ment against Nelson Smith, whereby the 
Sheriff of Princess Anne County, Virginia, was directed to 
be caused to be n1ade out of the g·oods and chat.tels of the said 
Nelson Smith the amount of said judgnwnt, with all interest 
thereon, and all costs recovered by the said Plaintiff in the 
aforesaid action ag·ainst Nelson Smith, which .said execution 
was delivered to the said Sheriff of Princess Anne County, 
returnable to the Second Septen1ber Rules, 1937, 'vhich said 
execution was duly returned by the said Sheriff to said Clerk's 
Office, marked ''No effect and unsatisfied"; that on the 17th 
day of December, 1937, an execution or jie1·i facias was like-
'vise sued out of the Clerk's Office of said Court against Nel-
son Smith and directed and delivered to the Sheriff of Prin-
cess Anne County, and returnable to the first Feb-
page 5 ~ ruary Rules, 1938, which said execution was duly 
returned by the Sheriff of Princess Anne County 
to said Clerk's Office on Dccen1ber 18, 1H37, n1arkecl "No ef-
fects and unsatisfied". 
That no part of the above-1nentioned judgn1ent in the 
an1ount of $2,500.00, interest or Court costs, has been paid by 
the said N olson Sn1ith, or anyone else for him, and the said 
judgn1ent, interest and costs rcn1ain due and unpaid to thi~ 
date. 
By reason of all of. which the Plaintiff will, I~ as aforesaid, 
move the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County for a judg-
ment against State Farm ~Iutual Automobile Inlsurance Conl-
pany, a foreign corporation, in the 2:unount of $~,500.00, with 
interest thereon fron1 the 29th day of October, 19.35, until paid, 
and $203.51 Court. costs. 11 
Given under n1y hand this 31st day of January, 1938. 
ANNA L. vVRIGHT, 
By CHAS. B. GODWIN, ,JR., 
Counsel. 
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And the return of the Sergeant of Richmond, Virginia, on 
the foregoing notice of motion is as follows : 
Executed within the City of Richmond, Virginia, this 11th 
day of February, 1938, by delivering a true copy of the within 
Notice of Motion in duplicate to Miss T. D. Young, Acting 
Secretary of the Commonw-ealth of Virginia, and as such 
Acting Secretary of the Commonwealth of Virginia the Stat-
utory Agent for the State F'arm Mutual Automobile Insur-
ance Company, a foreign Corporation; place of residence and 
place of business of said :Miss T. D. Young being in the City 
of Richmond, Virginia; fee of $2.50 paid the- acting S.ecretary 
at the time of service. Sergeant's fee paid $1.50. 
JOHN G. SAUNDERS, 
Sergeant of Richmond, Va. 
By P. H. BOWlS, 
Deputy Sergeant. 
page 6 ~ And at another day, to-wit: On the 28th day of 
February, 1938, the following order was entered: 
This day ca1ne the plaintiff by her attorney, and on her mo- _ 
tion it is ordered that this case be docketed, and the defend-
ant appeared by I-Iughes, Little & Seawell, its attorneys, and 
pleaded the general issue, to which the plaintiff replied gen-
erally and upon which plea issue is joined. 
And at another day, to-·wit: On the 4th day of April, 1938, 
the following order was entered: 
This day can1e again the parties by their attorneys and on 
motion of the plaintiff the defendant is required to file the 
grounds of its defense within ten days from the date hereof, 
and on motion of the defendant the nlaintiff is required to 
file a bill of particulars of her claim within five days from the 
date hereof. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 8th day of April, 1938, 
the following bill of particulars was filed by the plaintiff: 
The Plaintiff set~ out the following· as her Bill of Particu-
lars in the above action at law: 
. (1) ';rhe Plaintiff expects to rely on all matters alleged in 
her Notice of Motion. 
i 
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(2) The Plaintiff expects to rely upon thei provisions of a 
certain contract of public liability automobile insurance, dated 
on or about September 6, 1934, entered into between the State 
Farm 1\'Iutual Automobile Insurance C01npany and Nelson 
W. Smith, said policy of insurance having been filed in the 
Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County 
with the Notice of lVIotion in this· action. 
page 7 ~ (3) The Plaintiff expects to rely upon all plead-
, ings, evidence, orders and judgments, and all rec-
ords in the action of A'ltna L. 1lVright v. E. L. Swain,.Edwanl 
Swain and Nelson Sn~ith which was tried in the Circuit Court 
of Princess Anne County and appealed to the Supre1ne Court 
of Appeals of Virginia. 
( 4) The Plaintiff will furnish to the Defendant such other 
and further information that is available to the Plaintiff and 
requested by the Defendant. 
ANNA L. "\VRIGHT, 
By CHAS. B. GODWIN, JR., 
Counsel. 
.And at another day, to-wit: On the 11th day of April, 1938, 
the defendant filed thn followil1g grounds of defense: 
GROUNDS OF DEFENSE. 
The defendant, in answer to the call made upon it, hereby 
states the follo,ving grounds of defense, among others : 
1. That it has not been guilty of the breach of any duty 
owing· by it to the plaintiff in the pren1ises. 
2. That it has not been guilty of the breach of any duty 
alleg·ed against it in the notice of motion for j,uclgment. 
3. All n1atters which may be provable und~r the plea of 
general issue in this case. 
4. That the plaintiff has not taken all due and proper legal 
steps for the enforcement. of her judgment against the said 
Nelson Smith. I 
5. That by paragraph 1 of General Conditio~s in the con-
tract of insurance alleged in the said notice pf motion for 
judgment, and as shown in the policy of insurm)ce filed there-
with as an exhibit, it is provided as follows: ' 
page 8 ~ '' (1) Purposes of Use Defined. The term 'Pleas-
ure and Business' n1eans personal, pleasure and 
family use including business calls, and does not include, and 
the polic_Y does not co~er: when there is rentinl~, or livery use 
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of the automobile, or while anyone is being carried for a con-
sideration, unless it is otherwise expressly stated on Page 
1 of this Policy, or set out in written endorsement hereto at-
tached and an additional premimum is paid therefor." 
This defendant says that the above conditions is a valid 
stipulation in said contract, and that at the time of the acci-
dent as alleged in the notice of motion for judgment the said 
plaii;ttiff, Anna L. vVright, was being carried in the said au-
tomobile for a consideration under an agTeement theretofore 
had and entered into between the said .Anna L. Wright and 
Nelson Smith, and that no written· endorsement was made on 
or attached to the said policy as required, and no additional 
premium paid to this defendant therefor. 
6. That by paragraph 3 of the General Conditions in the 
said contract of insurance alleged in the notice of motion for 
judg·ment, and as shown in the policy of insurance therewith 
filed as an exhibit, it is pro·vided as follow!3: 
''The company shall not be liable * * * under Coverage G 
for bodily injury to any employee of the Assured while en-
gaged in the business of the Assured (other than domestic 
ernployment) or- in the operating, maintenance or repair of 
the automobile, or to any person to 'vhom the Assured may 
be held liable under any Workmen's Compensation Law, or 
to the Assured or any member of the family of the Assured 
residing· in the same household as the Assur-ed. Under Cov-
erages G and H for any liability assumed by the Assured ·un-
der oral or written contract or agreement.'' 
This defendant alleg·es· that at the time of the said accident 
the said Anna L. Wrig·ht ·was a member of the family 
. page 9 ~ of the assured, residing in the same household as 
the assured, and the above quoted clause of the 
said policy is a good and valid agreement. 
STATE F ARl\f MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURANCE C9MP ANY, 
By HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WELL, 
Counsel. 
And at another day, to-wit: On the 6th day of July, 1938, 
the following order was entered: 
This day came again the parties by their attorneys and a 
jury, to-wit: Arthur L. Caffee, Oswell C. Bright, Harvey 
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P. Brown and W. G. Eaton, who 'v~re duly sw~rn the truth to 
speak upon the issue joined, and after havfug fully heard 
· the evidence and argument of counsel, retired to their room 
to consult of a verdict, and after some time returned into 
Court having found the following verdict: , ''vVe the jury 
find for the plaintiff and fix the damages at $2,703.50 with 
interest on $2,500.00 from October 29th, 1935". 
Whereupon, the defendant, by counsel, moved the Court to 
set aside the verdict of the jury and enter judgment for the 
defendant, or at least grant it a new trial, upon the grounds 
that the same is contrary to the law and the evidence, which 
motion the Court overruled, to which action of the Court the 
defendant, by counsel, excepted. , 
Whereupon it is considered by the Court that the plaintiff 
recover of the defendant State Farm :Niutual .Automobile. In-
surance Company, a foi·eign corporation, the sum of Twenty-
seven hundred three dollars and Fifty cents ($2,703.50) with 
interest on $2,500.00 from the 29th day of October, 1935, and 
her costs in this behalf expended. 
And the defendant having express.ed its inten-
page 10 ~ tion to apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia for a 'vrit of error to the judg·ment, it is 
ordered that the execution of this judgment be 'suspended for 
a period of sixty (60) days from the date hereof, upon the 
defendant, or someone in its behalf, entering into a. suspend-
ing bond in the penalty of Thirty-five Hundred Dollars 
($3,500.00), with surety to be approved by th~ Clerk of this 
Court, conditioned according to law. 
page 11 ~ Virginia, 
In the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County. 
Anna L. Wright, Plaintiff, 
V. I 
State Farn1 1\{utual Automobile Jnsurance Company, a foreign 
corporation, Defendant. \: 
i' RECQR.D. I 
Stenographic report of all the testimony; the objections 
and motions, the action of the Court thereon, and the excep-
tions of the respective parties; all the instructions offered, 
the action of the Co'urt thereon, and the exceptions of the 
parties thereto; and all other· incidents of the trial of the case 
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ance Company, tried in the Circuit Court of Princess Anne 
County, Virginia, at Princess Anne Court House, on the 6th 
day of July, 1938, before Hon. B. D. White, Judge of said 
Court, and a jury. · 
Present: J\llr. Charles B. Godwin, Jr., Attorney for the 
plaintiff. 
· 1\fessrs. Hughes, Little & Seawell, by :Mr. Leon T. Seawell, 
Attorneys for the defencl!-1-nt. 
pag·e 12 ~ A jury was duly empaneled and sworn, opening 
statements were n1ade by counsel, and the follow-
. ing evidence was introduced : 
Mr. Godwin: Your I-Ionor, I wish, first, to introduce a copy 
of the record in the other case showing the pleadings and 
issues, the finding of the jury, the instructions, and the facts, 
and have it marked "Exhibit A". 
l\tfr. Seawell: If Your Honor please, I object to the intro-
duction of that record, as such, as an exhibit. If he 'vishes 
to. prove his judgn1ent in the former case, that is easily proved 
by the production of the judgn1ent docket here. I do not 
think there is any dispute as to that, Sir, but this record is a 
voluminous affair covering· 115 pages of matter that is en-
tirelv im1naterial to the issue which we have here and I do 
not think it is proper to file it as a.n exhibit in this case. 
~~[r. Godwin : Well, n1ay we, for the purposes of the case 
and for brevity, agree that 1\~Irs. Wright "ras injured as a 
1·esult of au accident while riding in ~1:r. Smith's car, Mr. . 
Seawell? 
1\fr. Seawell: I think, if Your Honor please, the proper 
procedure is merely to introduce the judgment 
page 13 ~ which he is s~tein.Q on in his notice of motion. 
Godwin? 
The Court: What parts of it do you want, Mr. 
J\IIr. Godwin: I will withdraw it as an exhibit if there is 
any objection to it. 
Your Honor, I will ask to introduce in evidence, marked 
"Plaintiff's Exhibit A", the jury's verdict in the case of 
.Am1a L. lV1·ight v. E. L. Swain, Edwanl Swain, and Nelson 
Sm.ith. 
The Court : Under the mandate of the Supren1e Court, I 
assume. 
~fr. Godwin: I will also ask to be introduced in evidence, 
to be n1arked "Plaintiff's Exhibit B ", a copy of the judg-
ment of the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County in the 
case of AnnaL. Wright v. E. L. Swain, Ed~oard Swain, and 
I 
I 
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N el.~o·n Smith; and also a copy of the final judgment entered 
in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgini~ in the case of 
AnnaL. J;Vright v. E. L. Swain, Edward Sw~in, and Nelson 
Smith, marked ''Exhibit C' '. 
Now, I also wish to introduce in evidence, marked "Plain-
tiff's Exhibit D, '' an execution issued and ~eturned in the 
aforesaid case; and to introduce in evidence another execu-
tion issued the 3rd day of August in the aforesaid case and 
properly returned, marked ''Plaintiff's Exhibit 
page 14 ~ E" and to introduce in evidence another execu-
tion, issued the 17th day of December, 1937, in the 
aforesaid case and properly returned, n1arked ''No effects,'' 
marked "Plaintiff's Exhibit F"; and a·nother execution is-
sued on the 17th day of December in. the aforesaid case, prop-: 
erly returned, ma.rked ''Plaintiff's Exhibit G." 
NELSON SMITH, 
called as a witness by the plaintiff and being duly sworn, 
testified as follows : 
Examined by 1\Ir. Godwin : 
Q. Captain Smith, what is your occupation? 
.A.. I am a State Pilot. 
Q. vVhere do you live, Sir 1 
.A. Warwick County, just outside of Newport News. 
Q. On the 3_rd day of Nove1nber, 1934, was ~Irs. Wright 
riding in your car at the time there was an accident on the 
Virginia Beach road 7 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. 'Vas she hurt as a result of that accident? 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. Suit was brought by her against you and 1\{r. Swain 
and others, was it not? 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
page 15 ~ Q. In that action lVIr. s,vain was dismissed and 
a judg1nent was obtained against ipu for $2,500, 
was it not? I' 
.A.. That is right, Sir. I 
Q. Was that car that you were driving insurrd 1 
.A.. Yes, sir. 
Q. I hand you a policy of insurance, Policy No. 1073337--
Va., issued by the State Farn1 1\{utual .... <\utomobile Insurance 
Company, of Blomnington, Illinois, to Nelson Smith, Insured, 
covering your car from September 6, 1934, to March 6, 1935; 
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Waf:? that policy of insurance the insurance carried on your 
car at the time of. this accident? 
A. I reckon it is. It has g·ot my name on it there-it 
must be. 
Q. Did you take that from the agent of the State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Company? . 
A. Yes, sir ; l\fr. Creech, I believe his name was. Mr. Creech 
sold me that. 
_ Q. Did you pay the premium charged by them for that 
coverage? 
.A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did you hav-e any other public liability insurance on 
your car at that time? 
.A. No public liability, no. 
page 16 r 1\Ir. Godwin: I wish to introduce this policy in 
evidence, marked ''Plaintiff's Exhibit H" 
,Q. 1\fr. Smith, when you were sued in the other case, did 
you employ an attorney to represent you? 
A. Mr.-the insurance con1pany's lawyer-Mr. Sharp, and 
:Nir. Rixey, I think, represented the insurance company. They 
represented 1ne in that case for the insurance company, I 
think. 
Q. You employed no attorney? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did they represent you at Princess Anne Court House? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did they represent you on appeal 'vhen the matter 
went to the Supreme CourtY 
A. I don't know; I reckon they did. I didn't go up there; 
I didn't have to go. I don't know anything about it. 
Q. You did not employ an attorney up there Y 
A. I did not, no, sir. 
Q~ Well, did they take over the complete investigation and 
the defense of your caseY · 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Mr. Smith, do you know of any conditions in that policy 
that you have violated, Sir Y 
A. Well, to tell you the truth, Mr. Godwin, I have 
page 17 r never read the policy through; I mean, I didn't 
up to the time we had the accident. In fact, 1 
never have now, and I couldn't tell you. I just took the in-
surance policy, like anybody else would, thinking that I would 
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I 
Q. Do you know of any of the provisions of it th~t you have 
violated? : ' 
Mr. Seawell: If Your Honor please, I object. The wit-
ness said he does not even lmow what the provisions are. . 
The Court: The objection is sustained. It is rather gen-
eral in its terms. 
CROSS EXAMINATION .. 
By I\Ir. Sea,vell: 
Q. Mr. Smith, I hand you a paper and ask you if that is 
your signature on that paper? 
A.· Yes, sir. 
Q. You signed that agreement with 1\fr. Sharp represent-
ing the insurance company, on· the 21th day of May, 1935? 
A. Yes, sir. That is just an agreement that they will in-
vestigate and adjust this claim-that is rigl~t, isn't itY 
page 18 ~ I\{r. Seawell : I offer this in evidence, if Your 
Honor please, as Defendant's Exhi~it 1. 
The Witness: That was just to give the~ a right to rep-
resent me, wasn't it? ' 
The Court: You signed it-you ought to lcnow what it is. 
The vVitness: I don't remember back that far, Judge. That 
is the way, I think, I understood it. 
RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
By J\.Ir. Godwin: 
Q. This is dated the 21st day of May, 1935, Mr. Hmi th. 
What date did the accident occur? I 
A. November 3, wasn't it, or 4th? 
Q. Of what year? 
A. 1934. 
Q. 1'934? 
A. Yes, sir. . 
Q. Then, you executed this paper sometime approximately 
SeVell ffiOnths after the accident OCCUrred? I 
A. I went up-I think 1\Ir. Sharp called me .. up to his office. 
He asked me to come up there about something, and I went 
up there and they gave me that ·and I thought it was to give 
them the right to represent me, or something-T-wasn't it, Mr. 
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Q. This says ~hat it is "A Non-waiver of Right 
page 19 ~ Agreement'' and that their representation of you 
''shall not be construed as a waiver of the rights 
of the insurance company to deny liability at any time under 
any policy or policies of insurance'' issued to you. 
A. Well, I would have been mighty foolish to sign it. I 
didn't know what I was signing, I don't reckon, because I 
certainly would not lay myself liable to be sued if I had ·no 
insurance policy, would I? 
1\tir. Godwin: Your Honor, we rest. 
~IRS. ANNA L. WRIGHT, 
the plaintiff, called as a witness by the defendant and being 
duly sworn, testified as follows : 
Examined by lVIr. Seawell: 
Q. You are 1\iirs. VV. J. (AnnaL.) Wright, the plaintiff in 
this action~ 
A. I am. 
Q. JYirs. Wrig·ht, do you recall, on 1\{arch 13, 1935, at Suf-
folk, that 1\tir. Sharp, who is sitting here·, in con-
page 20 ~ nection with your counsel, 1\fr. Godwin, and I also 
think that your son-in-la,v, 1\tir. Allen, 'vas present, 
you gave a statement with reference to your status in JYir. 
Smith's household¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. I show you-
l\1:r. Godwin: Your Honor, at this time, I wish to object 
and except to the introduction of that statement and I wish 
to move to strike out from the grounds of defense that por-
tion of the defense which deals with carrying a person in an 
automobile for consideration. 
The Court : I overrule your motion to strilm out the 
grounds of defense. I think it comes rather late. V..Te ought 
to have had notice of that before the jury was sworn, and I 
·will overrule your objection to the introduction of the state-
ment at this time. Let us see what it is. I don't kno,v-it 
may be relevant and it may not. 
1\tir. Godwin : I except to Your Honor's ruling·. 
By Mr. Seawell: 
Q. I show you this statement, Mrs. Wright, which is on 
I 
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three sheets of paper, and I show you a signature on each 
sheet; is that your signature on Sheet 11 
A. Yes. 
page 21 }- Q. Is that your signature on Sheet 2 ~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is that your signature on Sheet 31 
A. Yes. 
Q. Mrs. Wright, will you be good enough to read over that 
statement now, first, and then I will ask you some questions 
about it. 
A. You mean; read the three pages~ 
Q. Yes; just read it to yourself to familiarize yourself 
with it. 
Air. God,vin: You understand, Your Honor, that !fiY ex-
ception still goes to this same line of testimony? 
The Court: You object to all the questions. along this line 
with reference to that paper? 
Nlr. Godwin: That is right. 
Nir. Sea,vell: I might say, Sir, that 1\{r. Godwin has a copy 
of that statement. 
Q. (By Nir. Seawell:) You have read that statement now, 
1\IIrs. Wright"? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are the statements therein contained true, 1\{rs. Wright? 
A. Well, there is one or two there-I did not go 
page 22 }- to live at the Traymore; I was simply there until 
I could close the cottage and get away. l\IIy suit-
cases were up at my cottage, packed and ready to leave, and 
I was sleeping there at the Tray1nore Cottage 'vith my two 
daughters, upstairs and clown-both had apartments there 
-and I was leaving· in a day or two for Suffqlk and then on 
to Staunton, Virg·inia, with my sister, 1\{rs. Randolph, whom 
I spend my winters with mostly. I 
Q. The Traymore Apartment., though, wll~re you were 
staying at the time, is the apartment of Nfr.I1Nelson Smith, 
your son-in-law:? , 
A. Well, I was there, and I was upstairs with Mrs. Powell, 
also n1y daughter. She was on the second floo:r, and I would 
stay with first one and then the other, but Mr. Smith was 
assisting n1e with cleaning, locking the windows, and getting 
·everything in shape at the 17th Street house .so I could get 
away. 
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Q. But, I say, that Traymore Apartment is where Mr. 
Nelson Smith lives? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And yon got your meals there, didn't you¥ 
A. No. · 
Q. Where did you get your meals? 
A. I was working at the 17th Street house all day and I 
'vould go down there to sleep and I would have my 
page 23 r meals there-go do,vn there for supper and have 
my meals either upstairs with ~Irs. Powell or 
downstairs with Mrs . .Smith. 
Q. Is there any other statement in there that is not cor-
rect? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. The rest of that statement is a true statement of the 
facts, is it not, J\!Irs. Wright 1 
.A. I wrote that statement when Mr. Sharp was there at 
Mr .. ~lien's, in Suffolk, my first trip out of the bed after my 
lay-up of three months in bed. 
Q. Those statements are correct, though? 
A. Yes, I think they are. 
Q. This suit is by Anna L. Wright; that is you, Mrs. W .• T. 
Wright? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Mr. Seawell: Now, if Your Honor please, in order to 
shorten matters, I ask that that statement be filed, marked 
as an exhibit. (Marked "Defendant's Exhibit No. 2".) 
The Court: All right. 
The Witness: That statement, I said I went there to live 
-I did not go there to live; I was only there for a few days 
and I did not return any more all winter. I see there it says 
I went there to live. 
page 24 }- Examined by Mr. Godwin : 
Q. Mrs. Wright, I believe in less than one type-
written page you have attempted to tell them generally about 
yourself from 1932 to 'the time that you were hurt, in this 
statement. Now, in the first part of this statement, you 
state: "During- the winter months of 1932 and 1933, l\1:r. and 
Mrs. Nelson Smith lived at the Hicks Cottage, at Virginia 
Beach, Virginia. I was staying with them most of that time.~' 
Now, let me ask yon this question: How many children have 
you? 
1\1r. Seawell: If Your Honor please, I o~ject to that as 
being· hnmaterial and not in any way connected with the ques-
tions or issues in this case. It is not a question of dependency. 
The Court : I overrule the objection. 
By ~Ir. Godwin: 
Q. Now, during the winter months, after -xou have closed 
your cottage, with whom do you live Y I 
A. I go to Staunton with my sister, Mrs. EU W. Randolph; 
I g·o on out to vVest Virginia, to my brother jiin Huntington, 
West Virginia ; then I 'vill come back and visit around differ-
ent places; and my daughters-! may spend a month, say, 
with them. i 
Q. Was that your practice during these partlcu-
page 26 } lar times 1 
A. Yes, sir, absolutely. 
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tage on 17th Street, Virginia Beach," and ~{r. and 1\{rs. Smith 
came to live 'vith me''. 
A. Yes. 
Q. "We had an arrangement whereby 1\IIr. and J\t[rs. Smith 
were to live with me and help with the housework." Is that 
correct¥ 
A. Yes. 
· Q. ''1\{rs. Sn1ith was to take care of the arrangen1ents made 
with the guests and to assist generally. J\IIr. Smith was to 
help in the kitchen, to do the carving, and to go to the mar-
ket." Is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you further said that the usual charge for board 
at Virginia Beach is from twenty to t'venty-five dollars per 
week, and that you charged them the sum of $25.00 each per 
month for their board? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were they paying you board when they were living at 
your ·cottage¥ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And helping? 
A. And helping. 
page 27 ~ Q. And working there? 
A. And 'vorking. 
Q. Did 1\{rs. Smith generally work at your cottage? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was she there practically all the time? 
A. Yes, she was. Of course, she would go out occasionally. 
She knew what she had to do. 
Q. What would she do? 
A. She would receive the guests, and J\1:rs. Powell, too, and 
they would count n1y linens out, and anything that was to be 
done inside the house, or go out, either. 
Q. Now, was J\1:r. Smith there the n1ost of the time, or was 
he_attending to some business or duties of his own.? 
A. 1\fr. Smith was out, of course, so many days in the week, 
on a ship. He would leave when he was called out to take 
the ships out. 
Q. Now, I believe you say in this statement that ~Ir. and 
J\tirs. Smith left your cottage a bout October 15 and moved 
into the Traymore Apartment? 
A. I think it was about that time. 
Q. At that time, were you closing· your cottage or not? 
A~ Yes. It took me nearly a week, I reckon, to get that 
house all straightened up. I had to put it in order and lock 
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windows and put in windowpanes that were out, and get 
ready for the winter months. : 
page 28} Q. During the time that you were closing your 
cottage, were 1\tlr. and 1\{rs. :Smith helping you 
elose it, as they had helped you during the S'Qllliner months Y 
A. Yes, absolutely, they were. ~ 
By the Court: 
Q. When did the accident occur? 
A. November 3. 
Q. November, 1934Y 
A. Was it '33 or '34? 
The Court : 1934, I imagine. 
1\fr. Seawell: 1934, Sir. 
By Mr. Godwin: 
Q. Now, 1\{rs. Wright, on the day that this accident oc-
curred, do you know where Mr. Smith was going? . 
· A. They were going to Norfolk to a baseball game, he and 
his wife 1\{rs. Smith. · 
Q. ro a baseball game? 
A. I believe that is what they were going tq see. 
Q. "\Vas it baseball, or football? ' 
A. Football. 
Q. It was in November-right late to play baseball. 
A. Football, of course. 
Q. Did they g·o to the football game 1 
A. They did. They were to meet me at 5 :00 
pag·e 29 ~ o'clock or a little after four, between four and five, 
in front of Smith & Welton's, pick Jr,le up and bring 
me home after I had been around and attended to what I h'ad 
to do. !1 
Q. I believe you said something just now about your liv-
ing, during the time you were closing your cott%e, with either 
one or the other of your daughters f :· · 
A. Yes. i' Q. vVbat size apartment did they take afterr'they left your 
place? , 
A. They had two rooms-one bedroom andi a living room 
and a kitchenette. 1 
Q. I believe you said, in response to ~Ir. Seawell's ques-
tion, you would eat down at your house-
A. I would prepare my meals or go out to. my meals up 
there while I was working, and some evenings\:! would go on 
I 
/ 
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down there to supper, but not always, and I stayed there un-
til I got everything fixed. 
Q. Now, did :Wirs. Powell, your other daughter, live in the 
Traymore Apartment, too, after you left your cottage~ 
A. She did. 
Q. And you spent your time between the hvo ~ 
A. Between the two. 
(Both parties rested.) 
page 30 ~ ~Ir. Godwin: If Your Ifonor please, I wish to 
make a motion before the Court. I don't know 
whether the jury should hear it, or not. It is in the discretion 
of the Court. 
J\!Ir. Seawell: Before we go into any further motions· or 
examinations, I "rould like to read to the jury this statement 
which has been filed. 
~Ir. Godwin: I wish to make n1y motion before some other 
portions of the statement are read to the jury. 
(The motion was then taken up in chan1bers.) 
~fr. Godwin: Your Honor, I, of course, 'vish to 1·enew my 
objection to the introduction of this statement insofar as it 
applies to the question of consideration for use of the car, 
and move the Court to withdraw the statement or those 
portions of it that pertain to that, for these reasons: 
When this case was originally tried, it was defended by the 
insurance company, the real party in interest in the case. 
They, of course, had their contract to pay any judgment that 
might be obtained. Now, Your Honor, I did not know what 
status ~Irs. 'Vright occupied in the car. I wanted that passed 
upon by the Court in the original case, and I put J\!Irs. vV right 
on the stand to prove their relationship, as to 'vhether or 
not it was a joint adventure, or whether or not it was a guest 
case, or what it n1ight be, because I thought it was 
page 31 }- for the Court to detern1ine that to give the proper 
instructions. 
Now, when I put Mrs. Nelson on to prove the arrangement, 
they objected (citing lifT right v. Swain, et a.l., R., p. 46). They 
took the position that I had to prove a guest case because I 
had alleged culpable negligence. I attempted in every way 
to prove the relationship as it existed behveen them, to try 
to get the Court to pass on that issue, but the Court held that 
she was a guest, or that I had to prove that she was a g"Uest, 
and therefore the insurance c01npany, on their motion, re-
I 
I 
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quired me to prove that she was a guest in t;h.e car. That is 
shown on pages 46, 47, 48, 49, and 50 of the record, which 
I wish to introduce in 'evidence as a part of this motion. (See 
p. 42 of this record for copy of the citation.) 
Further, again I renewed that motion at the afternoon ses-
sion, which is shown on pages 64, 65, 66, 67, and 68 of the 
record, which I also wish to introduce in this case as a part 
of this motion (copied at p. 42 of this record), in which I said 
this, ·Your Honor: ''When they asked me for a bill of par-
ticulars, I alleged that she was riding in the car without de-
. fining her status, which I think the Court will define, because 
I am frank to say, 'vhether he is a servant of~ her or whether 
she was a passenger or a guest, that would be. the duty of the 
Court to determine under the evidence.'' 
page 32 ~ After renewing my motion, the Court held that 
she was a guest and that I had to 1 prove that she 
was a guest, and in the instructions submitted to the jury, 
the Court submitted the issue of the question of guest, and 
guest alone. I also wish to introduce all of the instructions, 
as shown by this record, commencing on page 99 of the record 
and running through page 111. 
Now, your Honor, I say that the insurance company is the 
real party in interest, that they were defending this case by 
their counsel, and that they had agreed to pay counsel fees, 
damages, interest, and costs, and they were the real parties, 
after all, that were in inte.rest. If not, they were certainly 
privies in interest of the party that they ·were defending in 
this Court, and that these issues have been submitted to a 
jury in this case between the same. parties and it has been 
held that she ·was a guest, it 'vent to the Court of Appeals 
and was held on the basis of a guest, and .now they are 
estopped to deny it and now it is res adjudicata and forever 
binding against them on that question. 
Under those circumstances, your Honor, I say that the 
company cannot, in the original case, come in and say this : 
"You l1ave g·ot to prove that she was a guest!bcfore you can 
get a verdict, and it is the hardest case in Virginia 
page 33 ~ to win. We are going to put you Ito winning the 
. hardest case that we ·possibly can, JPut if you win, 
then we are going to come back in the next ~ase, when you 
sue the insurance company, and say 'you wete not a guest; 
you were riding for a consideration and you: were a paying 
passenger and, therefore, we are out of it.':~' Now, Your 
Honor, that is the situation which this case presents, and I 
say, as a matter of law, that they have chosen and elected 
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the same parties and the same interests, and they cannot now 
change that situation legally and they are bound by it. 
(The motion was further argued by counsel.) 
The Court: I take it that the Supreme Court has already 
passed upon this question and it is, as between-you, now ~res 
adjudicata, and that she was a guest and not a passenger for 
a consideration. I c.annot read that Supreme Court decision 
any other 'vay. They have passed on it as a guest case. 
}VIr. Seawell: It was carried up to the Supreme Court as 
a guest case ; it is brought here as a guest case. 
The Court : Now. you are trying to def-end on the ground 
that she was being carried for a consideration, under that 
contract. 
page 34 r ~Jr. Seawell: That is true, Sir. 
The Court: I think that question should have 
been raised in the other case, under the contract. I think 
J\{r. Godwin's objection should be sustained, to which action 
of the Court you except. 
1\{r. Seawell: I except, Sir. And I think it is very plain 
from their original record which has been introduced in evi-
dence in this case as to exactly 'vhat the steps 'vere, and, in 
order to be res ad.iudicata, it has to be a little more closely 
connected than that; you have to have a contest between the 
same parties arising out of the -same cause, and, of course, 
this arises out of the same accident, but tins arises out of 
contract; the other· arose out of tort. 
The Court: The Supreme Court has held that she was a 
guest. 
Mr. Seawell: It came up to the Court of Appeals as a guest 
case, simply and solely, and they did not have to consider 
the other feature of it at all, and they passed upon it as a 
guest case and they said, We think this evidence shows it was 
a guest case. 
The Court: And counsel in the other case defended it as 
a guest case, and it seems to me now you are estopped to come 
in and blow hot and blow cold. I sustain the ob-
page 35 } jection. 
J\1r. Seawell: Reference is also made to the re-
·port and decision of 1Vri_qht v. Swain, decided June 10, 1937, 
and reported in 191 Southeastern, page 611, 168 Va. 315. 
(Both parties rested.) 
I 
i 




Plaintiff's Instruction No. 1-Refused: ! 
37 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from a 
preponderance of the evidence that the automobile in which 
AnnaL. Wright was riding and injured wasiinsured by the 
defendant, and that. the policy of insurance sued on in this 
action was in full force and legal effect at the time of the 
accident you shall find for the plaintiff.'' 
}.{r. Godwin : I except to the refusal of the Court to grant 
Instruction No. 1, on the ground that there is no evidence that 
Mrs. V\Tright was a member of Mr. Smith's family and no 
evidence that she was being transported for a consideration. 
page 36 ~ Plaintiff's Instruction No. 2-Gra'i'f'ted: 
''The Court instructs the jury that if they believe from the 
evidence that at the time of the accident the I plaintiff Anna 
L. Wright was not a member of the family of Nelson Smith, 
residing in the same household as the said Nelson Smith, you 
shall :find for the plaintiff.'~ 
Mr. Seawell : The defendant excepts to the granting of 
Instruction No. 2-P for the plaintiff, upon the ground that 1 
it does not contain the qualification with reference to the 
plaintiff's being carried in the automobile at the time of this 
accident for a consideration, the evidence introduced show-
ing that at the tirne of said accident plaintiff was being car-
ried for a consideration under an agreement had with the de-
fendant and his wife. 
Defendant's Instruction No. 1-Grante(l: 
''The Court instructs the jury that the bur<Jen of proof is 
upon the plaintiff to prove affirmatively by a [preponderance 
of the evidence the matters alleged in the notice of motion 
for judgment.'' 
Defen4ant's Instruction No. 2-Refused: 
"The Court instructs the jury that by a cQndition of the 
policy of insurance here sued upon the policy does 
page 37 ~ not cover the occasion while anyone is bein·g car-
ried for a consideration. This is Ei valid stipula-
tion of the contract. I 
38 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
''If, therefore, you believe from the evidence in this case 
that at the thne of the accident complained of the plaintiff, 
Anna L. "\Vright, was being carried in the automobile o\vned 
and operated by Nelson Smith for a consideration, then and 
in that event the policy of insurance does not cover the risk 
and liability arising from such accident, and you must find 
for the defendant. 
''In considering the phrase 'bei_ng carried for a considera-
tion' it is not necessary that there should be a money con-
sideration for the carriag·e, it being· sufficient that some bene-
fit or advantage or profit shall accrue to the parties.'' 
~Ir. Seawell: The defendant excepts to the action of the 
Court in refusing to grant Instruction No. 2-D asked by the 
defendant, upon the g-round that the evidence shows a con-
tractual relationship existing between the plaintiff and Nel-
son Smith whereby, for, a consideration, the use of Nelson 
Sn1ith 's automobile was to be for the benefit and at the dis-
posal of the plaintiff, Anna L. W rig·ht; that by the terms. of 
the policy existing in this case, an exception is therein con-
tained as to anyone being carried at the tin1e of 
page 38 ~ an accident for a consideration. The defendant 
contends that it is not res adfndicata or estoppel 
as to the action which may have been taken by the defendant, 
Nelson Smith, in the original suit which 'vas tried in the 
Circuit Court of Princess Anne County ·wher·ein Anna L. 
\Vright was plaintiff and Nelson Smith, E. L. s,vain, and E. 
Swain were defendants~ this defendant, the State Farm 1\:fu-
tual Insurance Company, not being· a party to that litigation, 
and the question here raised being one based upon contract, 
whereas, the original suit was based upon tort. Further, it 
appears from the record introduced in evidence that at the 
trial of the case of Anna L. TV r·ight v. Nelson S1nith and 
others, the plaintiff soug·ht to introduce evidence tending to 
show the contractual relation, which was refused, ho,vever, 
upon the specific gTound that the pleadings in the case were. 
based upon duties owing to a guest, and no contractual re-
lationship was therein set forth, and therefore, the evidence 
along this line was imn1aterial and improper. 
Defendant's lnstnwtim't No. 3-Granted: 
"One of the provisions of the policy here sued under is 
that the insurance company shall not be liable for 
page 39 ~ bodily injury sustained by 'any member of tho 
family of the assured residing in the same house-
I I 
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hold as the assured.' This is a valid stipul~ti~n of the con-
tract. 
"If, therefore, you believe from the evidence in this case 
that at the time of the accident complained 'of the plaintiff, 
AnnaL. Wright, was a member of the family bf Nelson Smith 
(the assured), residing in the same household as Nelson 
Smith (the assured), then the said contract of insurance does 
not cove.r the said accident and you should D.nd for the de-
fendant.'' 
Mr~ Godwin: I except to the gTanting of defendant's In- 1 · 
struction D-3, on the ground that there is no evidence that 
:ft'Irs. "\Vright was a member of the family of Nelson Smith 
at the time of the accident. 
Mr. Seawell: We cannot read from her statement to the 
jury? 
The Court: All except insofar as the. consideration. You 
cannot argue that there was a consideration. · 
page 40 ~ The Court then read to the jury the instructions 
granted, as above shown, and the case was argued 
by counsel; the jury retired to consider of their verdict, and 
after'Y'ards returned the following verdict: 
VERDICT. 
''We, the jury, find for the plaintiff and fix the damages 
at $2,703.05, with interest on $2,500 from October 29, ~935.'' 
~{r. Seawell: The defendant moves the Court to set aside 
the verdict and to enter judgment for the defendant, or at 
least to grant it a new trial, upon the ground that the ver-
dict is contrary to the la'v and the evidence; for misinstruc-
tion of the jury ; for refusal to instruct the jury as requested; 
and also· because the evidence does not show th~t any garnish-
ment was ever issued as against the defendant~ Nelson 1Smith, 
in an attempt to make the original judgment from him. 
Th~ Court : The mQtion is overruled, to thich action of 
the Court you except. j: 
1\'Ir. Seawell: Yes, sir, we except; and for 1the purpose of 
the suspending bond, will Your Honor indicate the 
page 41 ~ amount of the bond? · 
The Court : $3,500 will be sufficient. 
page 42 ~ Ext1·acts !ro1n the Record vn the Supreme Oourt 
of Appeals of Virginia in the case. of Arma L. 
I 
I' 
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Wright v. E. L. Swain, E. Swai·n and N. 8{Jnith, intrqduced 
by cownser for the plaintiff in support of motion to exclude 
staterne1~t of AnnaL. Wright (page 21, S'ltpra): 
(Page 46 et seq:) 
Q. Mr. Smith, I want to ask you concerning the arrange-
ments under which you and Capt. Smith lived with Mrs. 
vVright. 
Mr. Rixey: If Your Honor pleases, I don't kno'v 'vhat my 
friend is driving at, but I think possibly in arguing this mat-
ter the jury had better be excluded while 've take this point 
up. 
The Gourt: "\Vhat was your arrangement~" Is that the 
question' 
Mr. Godwin: J\{r. Rixey said to the jury this morning in 
his opening statement that Mrs. vVright was a guest in the 
car of J\ir. Smith. Now I intend to introduce evidence to 
show that she was not a guest in the car. 
The Court: I expect the jury had better step out. Step 
in that room, Gentlemen, until you are called. 
Note : The jury retired. 
Mr. Rixey: If Your Honor please, the notice of motion 
in this case alleges that 1\fr. Smith was guilty of 
page 43 ~ gToss, willful, wanton and culpable negligence. 
That is all it alleges against l\ir. Smith. I asked 
for a bill of particulars in this case and the bill of particulars 
given reiterates that we were guilty of gross, 'villful, wanton 
and culpable negligence, and does not allege simple negli-
gence unless you might say that simple negligence is included 
in gross negligence. Inasmuch as he is basing his case solely 
on the ground of gross negligence, I subntit he is not entitled 
to change his cause of action against us basing it now on some 
relationship which requires a greater deg-ree of care than 
that required of a host to his guest. 
The Court: Let's see the notice of motion, please, sir. 
Does it allege that she was a guest in the car' 
Mr. Rixey: It does not alleg·e what her status was in the 
car. 
The Court : Does the bill of particulars f 
Mr. Rixey : Here is the bill of particulars : ''That N el-
son Smith was guilty of willful, wanton, culpable, and gross 
negligence in that he attempted to pass a motor truck on the 
highway at a fast rate of speed, under the circumstances, with-
I 
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out giving audible warning and aftJr the driver of 
page 44 ~ the truck in front of him had give:h lawful signal 
of his intention to turn across said h:ighway.'' The 
only basis he gives for his right of action is that we were 
guilty of gross, willful, wanton and culpable negligence. 
:Nir. Godwin: Aftet you read that and before you pass on 
it, I would like to be heard on his point. 
The Court : All right. 
Mr. Godwin: Your Honor, with reference to the bill of 
particulars and the notice of motion, I allege in them both 
that ~Ir. Swain and ~Ir. Smith 'vere guilty of gross negligence. 
A man can be guilty of gross negligence and still be liable to 
someone who is not a guest in his automobile. He would be 
much n1ore liable, and I don't see that the degree of negli-
gence that a n1an is guilty of has anything to do with the 
status of the party except possibly in a guest case where it 
has to be a high~r degree of negligence. In this case they are 
claiming that she is a guest and I have got to allege as much 
as gross neglig·ence in order to have any standing in this court 
if they prevail in their theory, and if they don't prevail in 
their theory then simple negligence entitles me to a verdict~ 
The Court: Not as to S1nith 1 
page 45 ~ ~Ir. God,vin: Yes, if she is not a guest. They 
arc claiming she is and I am claiming she is not. 
The Court: Your notice of motion carries the inference 
at least that she was a g·uest because you allege gross neg-
ligence, and the view I take of your bill of particulars is that 
she eliminates. Swain from it entirely. 
1\tir. Rixey: I didn't read the provision wit1 reference to 
l\fr. Swain. 
The Court: You read it with reference to Mr. Smith, but 
in the third cia use of the bill of particulars you say: ''That 
Nelson Smith 'vas guilty of willful, wanton, culpable, and 
gross neglige11ce in that he attmnpted to pass ~ motor truck 
on the high,vay at a fast rate of speed, under the circum-
stances, without giving audible 'varning and after the driver 
of the truck in front of him had given lawfulj signal of his 
intention to turn across said highway."" Youi· bill of par-
ticulars eliminates Swain in the case. _ i' 
!'Ir. Godwin: Why? The law does not weighJ:the ~egree of 
negligence between two tort feasors. One c~n be slig·htly 
negligent and the other can be n1ost negligent. 
The Court: But in your pleadings you haven't 
page 46 ~ got it that way. It is very adroitly drawn and 
quite characteristic of you, as a m:atter of fact. 
Yon are an adroit la,vyer and have drawn this :very adroitly. 
1\{r. Godwin : I am trying to cover my case. 
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The Court: What was the question, what is the arrange-
ment? 
Mr. Godwin: I not only furnished them with a bill of par-
ticulars but gave them absolute right to come to ·Suffolk and 
take a written statement from my client back yonder on 
~{arch 13, 1934, and as far as my position in this case is con-
cerned, I am taking this position, that if the Court holds 
under proper instructions that she is a guest in that car, 
then I am bound to meet this allegation of the highest neg-
lig·ence, 'but if the Court takes the position that she isn't a 
guest in that car then I don't have to prove that hig·h degree 
even though he is guilty of it. I can allege' in the notice of 
motion that I am a passenger in the Smith car and that Mr. 
Swain willfully and deliberately hurt me. 
Mr. Rixey: You haven't alleged that.shc was a passenger. 
He hasn ~t alleged that this lady was a passenger. 
The Court: Inferentially it does because of the 
page 47 ~ degree of negligence he has alleged. 
1\fr. R.ixey: He says she was riding· in the car 
being operated by Mr. Smith, that Mr. Smith was guilty of 
gross negligence, and I take it that is equivalent to the allega-
tion that she 'vas a guest of Mr. Smith because that is the 
only ground on which he can hold Mr. Smith. 
Mr. Godwin : I am trying to show this : I think I can 
prove by uncontradicted testimony that ~1r. Smith and 1\IIrs. 
Smith came to live in the home of 1\{rs. Wright at the Beach, 
and that they agreed to do certain things for ~1:rs. Wright 
and Mrs. W rig·ht gave them board at a reduced rate by rea-
son of that arrangement, and that Mrs. Wright was not a 
guest in this car, and I think I can show a contractual rela-
tion. 
Mr. Rixey: We asked for a bill of particulars in this case 
and that was not set up. The bill of partic~tlar he gave us 
said she was riding in Capt. Smith's car and he says Capt: 
Smith was guilty of gross, willful, wanton and culpable neg-
ligence. If he is going- to base his case on a passenger and 
not a guest, I think we ought to have been given notice. · 
The Court: I think so, too. 
1\fr. Godwin: Y o:ur Honor, I have given them 
page 48 ~ that notice. 
The Court: Where is it in the bill of particu-
lars? 
Mr. Godwin: I haven't said it in the bill of particulars, 
whether she was a passenger or a guest. 
· The Court: There is no contractual relation alleged in 
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in the bill of particulars. How do you expe~t a recovery on 
a contract if you don't allege it Y '. 
1VIr. Godwin: I am asking· for a recovery· on the basis of 
negligence and I an1 introducing this agreement to show that 
she was not a guest in the car; that is all. I am not asking 
to recover on any contract but on negligence of Capt. Smith. 
The Court: All right. v,. arious degTees of negligence 
that depend upon the relationship of the parties? 
~fr. Godwin: Yes. 
The Court: If that is the purpose of your question, I 
sustain the objection. 
::1\'Ir. Godwin: I 'vant to go further than this, because I 
want to sho:w this to the Court, that in ~larch, on March 
13th, 1935, this same question arose and I took the position 
that she was not a guest in the car and I gave Mr. Sharp, 
who 'vas representing the defendant and who came to Suf-
folk, permission in my presence to go over and take a state-
ment from 1\tirs. Wright and have her outline the 
page 49 r status that she occupied in that car at that time. 
When they asked for a bill of particulars they 
said nothing in particular as to what they wanted, and I had 
g·iven this information and I then filed the bill of particulars 
stating· that he was guilty of gToss negligence in the man-
agement of the car. They have asked for no further infor-
mation because they had it, and they knew what n1y case was 
when they came here today and it is not a matter of surprise 
at all, but if Your If on or holds with them I would like to 
amend these pleadings. 
~f r. Rixey : We a ro taken at a very serious disadvantage 
in this case if Your Honor is going to a11ow him to amend. 
The Court: It has to be tried on the pleadings, of course. 
The pleadings show inferentially that she was a guest from 
the degree of negligence alleged that the defendant is guilty ; 
of, and the bill of particulars is to the same·. effect, and it 
seems to Ine that if you are going to rely on evidence that 
there 'vas son1e contractual relationship the pleadings should 
show it. I sustain the objection. i 
1\IIr. Godwin: There is a recent case in Virginia on it. I 
'vas looking at it last night. ' 
The Court: If I gave you leave .'to amend and 
page 50 ~ they asked for a continuance, I think they would 
. be entitled to it. : 
:Wir. God·win: It. was decided that allegation of gross neg-
ligence and willful and wanton negligence in a· matter where 
you only have to prove simple neg·ligence would be surplus-
ag·e and you could strike it out . 
.. The Court: I sustain the objection. 
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Mr. Godwin: I thought I had the case here. 
The Court : If this was a criminal case, a charge of mur-
der, it would include everything to assault and battery, but 
in a negligence case then the defendant is entitled to notice 
of what you expect to prove. 
Mr. Godwin: In this case I am not permitted to. show that 
he was guilty of simple negligence because I allege a higher 
duty? 
The Court : I-Iow would· you expect to recover on simple 
negligence if she was a guest~ 
11:r. Godwin: The Court of Appeals has recently. held that 
the question of whether she· is a guest, or not, is a matter to 
be placed before this jury under proper instructions of the 
court. How can I get that before the jury unless I allege the_ 
higher degree of care? 
, The Court: That is what you have done, but 
page 51 ~ ho'v do you expect to recover on simple negligence 
unless there is some contractual relationship¥ 
Mr. Godwin: If there is a contractual relationship be-. 
tween these people, that would determine the degree of neg-
ligence I have to prove. 
The Court: Then you should have alleged it in your notice 
of motion. Call the jury, Mr. Sheriff. 
Mr. Godwin: . I want to except to the Court's ruling for 
the reasons stated in my arg·ument on this point. 
(Page 64 et seq:) 
Mr. Godwin : I expected to prove this morning the rela-
tionship that existed between 1\:Ir. Smith and ~Irs. ·wright 
pursuant to an agreement they had bet,veen themselves in 
respect to board and lodging and in respect to each other. 
As far as their status is concerned, I suppose it would be the 
duty of the Court, after hearing the evidence, to determine 
the status they occupied. I have alleged in these pleadings 
that both parties were 'villfully negligent, grossly and culpa-
bly negligent, in coming together in the highway in the man-
ner they did. When theY, asked me for a bill of 
page 52 ~ particulars I alleged that she was riding in the 
car without defining her status, which I think the 
Court will define, because I am frank to say, whether he is a 
servant of her or whether she was a passenger or a guest, 
that would be the duty of the Court to determine under the 
evidence. I have also stated in mv notice of motion that he 
was guilty of willful wanton, culpable and gross negligence 
in att~mpting to pass that vehicle on the highway at a fast 
rate of speed after this man had turned over there and had 
i 
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given him a signal that he was going in that alley. Your 
.Honor, I take this position, that I have alleged the highest 
degree of neglig-ence and that if I can prove any degr~e of 
negligence up to that degree I would be entitled to a verdict, 
if she was a guest. If I fail in that, then I would be entitled 
to a verdict on simple negligence. 
The Court : As against Smith 1 
l\ir. Godwin : Yes. 
The Court: vVhy ~ 
1\{r .. Godwin: Because if she occupies a status other than 
a guest sin1ple ne~ligence applies, and that is why I have 
drawn this. 
The Court: \Vith that double aspect. . 
, ~Ir. Godvvin: In this case I have here the Court 
page 53 ~ says (reading authority). This is a case in 162 
Va. 164, and it goes into wl1at is gross and wanton, 
and what is silnple negligence, so I am renewing, Your Honor, 
my request to put my evidence on as to the relationship that. 
existed between them. If the Court overrules it and holds 
that I have to prove \Villful, wanton, gross and culpable neg·-
lig-ence then, of course, I will have to put somebody else on 
the stand and produce further evidence, which I can produce. 
The Court: I will sustain the motion to reject the evidence 
as to their relationship. Not only that, J\llr. Godwin, but 
your client has already testified and she can't claim any 
·higher than that which she has testified to, and she has not · 
testified to any contractual relationsl1ip, or. any question of 
servant or agency, or anything of that kind, and you will be 
confined to the highest degree of care. _ 
l\fr. Godwin: I 'vant to subn1it evidence here of the fact 
that they had notice prior to this that there was this con-
tractual relationship between the parties. I understand, 
lVIr. Rixey, you are taking the position she was a guest solely? 
Do you object on the ground that you take the position that 
this is a guest cnse, as you stated in your opening statement, 
and, therefore, we have to prove gro~s, wilful, wan-
page 54 ~ ton and _culpable neglig~nce? ~ . 
· Nlr. RL"'\:ey: I am talnng· the pos~t1on that you. 
haven't alleged anything more than a guest ca~e and you are 
confined to your pleadings. '! 
If Your Honor pleases, I move that Your Hop or· strike out 
tl1e evidence as far as ~{r. Smith is concerned~ 
Mr. Godwin: Before you rule on that, if; Your Honor 
holds-
The Court : I have already held. 
Mr. Godwin: .Assuming Your Honor has hel? that she was 
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a guest, to which I have excepted, I want to put on one more 
witness. . 
Mr. Rixey: I submit that under the testimony of the plain-
tiff herself there is shown no negligence on the part of Mr. 
Smith, and regardless of how much evidence he may put on 
he is still bound by his own client's testimony. 
· The Court: You move to strike out the plaintiff's testi-
mony7 
1\fr. Rixey : Yes. 
The Court: That motion I will have to· overrule and 
leave it to the jury to say whether driving· around the truck 
in the manner he did was gross negligence. 
~Ir. Rixey: The plaintiff has rested its case, 
page 55 ~ as I understand it. 
The Court: He has shown by evidence that the 
driver of tlie truck was holding his hand out and was in the 
middle alley of the road and was making his left turn, and 
that this man came along-of course, there is no evidence 
here as to speed. 
Mr. Rixey: Yes, betw~een 35 and 40 miles an hour. 
The Court: And driving along· behind the truck, 50 feet 
1away, with the man holding his hand out indicating he was 
going to make his turn, he pulled to the left and attempted 
to pass. I will leave that to the jury to say whether or not it 
was gross neg·ligence. · 
Mr. Rixey: We note an exception. 
Mr. Godwin: I would like to put on o~e more witness. 
1\tir. Richard Kellam: We want to make a motion on that . 
also, and wonder 'vhether we should wait until the other wit-
ness testifies. 
The Court: Let's have it now. 
Mr. Richard I\::ellam: Our contention is that there has 
been no negligence shown against the Swain people at all. 
The specific evidence is that 1\fr. Smith first saw the truck 
starting to make its left-hand turn when he was within 50 or 
60 feet of the truck and that they were driving then at a rate 
of between 35 and 40 miles an hour. The statute 
page ,56 ~ requires that a person must have hi's car so 
equipped with brakes that he can stop it within a 
distance of 75 feet driving ~at the rate of 50 miles an hour, 
or a distance of 50 feet driving at a rate of 40 miles an hour, 
and at a rate of 20 miles an hour within 25 feet, so at a rate 
of 40 an hour he must be able to stop within 50 feet. 
The Court: Is that a regulation of the State Highway 
Department? 
Mr. Richard Kellam: It is in the Code. 
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Mr. Rixey: You can stop a car going at 4;0 miles an hour 
in 50 feet? · . 
l\{r. Richard I{ellam : A man testified the other day, an 
officer, that he could stop his car operating::at 50 miles an 
hour in 40 feet. 1 
Note: The statute was thereupon read. 
Mr. Rixey: Where is the provision about 40 miles an 
hour? 
l\fr. Richard I{ellanl: You double each one of them. 
The Court: The momentum would be greater at a high 
rate of speed than at a lower rate. 
lVIr. Richard ·Kellam: If he was going at a rate of 35 or 40 
miles an hour, and a person saw the truck as he started to 
make his turn when he was within 50 or 60 feet, he had plenty 
· of time to stop his automobile before running into 
page 57 } the truck. We have testimony o£ different wit-
nesses that the truck pulled to the center of the 
highway and gave his left-hand signal, and that the right 
lane was clear of .on-con1ing traffic, and he had plenty of space 
to pass on the right-hand side, and that the shoulder on the 
right-hand side 'vas six or eight feet wide. The first witness 
. said he didn't kno·w whether he gave any signal, or not, and 
also said he clidn 't know whether the stop light was working, 
or not. The testimony is that the stop light was working and 
that after the accident had happened that they got in and 
tested the stop light and that it was still working. The fur.: 
ther testimony was that the car that Mrs. Wright was in 
struct the truck just at the back of the cab indicating that the 
truck had gotten further across the boulevard because 
two 'vheels of the W rig·ht car was completely off the 
boulevard. If there is any negligence at all on the part 
of 1\fr. Smith insofar as the Swains are cbncerned, that 
negligence is imputed to 1\frs. Wright because in our 
special plea filed we allege that the driver of the car was the 
agent and servant for ~Irs. Wright and that:they were en-
gaged in a joint enterprise, and that agency!' has not been 
denied by the plaintiff, so that anyj 1 negligence on 
page 58 ~ the part of Smith, the driver of the car in which 
1\frs. W rig·l1t was riding, is imputable to Mrs. 
Wright. The burden is on them to prove negligence on the 
part of Swain. Mrs. Wright, herself, testifiedithat when she 
first saw the truck she was 100 feet of it and then she said 
50 or 60 feet from it, she didn't know which. If the driver is· 
her agent and servant, she has got to take some precaution· 
I 
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for her own protection, and if she doesn't she is guilty of 
negligence herself, so that if Smith was guilty of any neg-
ligence which either caused or contributed to the accident it 
is imputable to Mrs. \Vright and they are not entitled to re-
cover as against Swain. 
The Court: I overrule the motion. 
~{r. Rixey: I have read this case of Thon~as against Snow, 
162 Va. 654, from which ~Ir. Godwin read a few minutes ago. 
l\{ay I read it in connection with 1ny motion f It gives the 
best definition of gross negligence that I have been able to 
.find and it is the only adequate definition I have been able to 
.find. (Reading from 1'ho'lnas v. Snow, 162 Va. 654.) I submit 
the evidence in this case can't possibly bring it wit}lin the 
terms of that. Here is a car traveling along at 35 or 40 miles 
an hour and when it gets within 50 feet of a truck proceeding 
in the same direction and going at a very slow 
page 59 ~ rate of speed, that truck turns to the left. I submit 
the plaintiff is bound by her own testimony 'vhen 
she says that her son-in-law was trav-eling at a reasonable 
speed and did everything he could to avoid it. I think her 
own testimony doesn't show even simple negligence, and 
certainly it doesn't bring it within the terms of this definition. 
The Court: The law requires me to operate my car in such 
a manner when I am overtaking a vehicle as to have it under 
complete control. He 'vas 'vithin 50 feet of the truck going 
in the same direction that properly indicated it was going to 
make a left-hand turn, and it seems to me that it ought to be 
left to the jury. I overrule the motion. 
Mr. Rixey: Exception. 
page 60 ~ Virginia : 
In the Circuit Court of Princess Anne County. 
Anna L. Wright, 
v. 
State Farm ~futual .Automobile Insurance Company. 
NOTICE OF .APPEAL. 
To AnnaL. Wright: 
Please Take Notice That on the 28th day of July, 1938, at 
10 o'clock .A. lVI., or as soon thereafter as ·we may be heard, 
the undersig·ned will present to the Judg·.e of said Court its 
certificate of exceptions to be signed by the Judge and made 
a part of the record in this case. 
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You Will Further Take Notice That the undersigned will, 
on the same day, request the Clerk of said Cqurt to make up 
and deliver to it a transcript of the record i:p. the above en-
titled case for the purpose of presenting the! same, tog·ether 
with a petition for writ of error 'to the Supreme Court of 
Appeals of Virginia. 
Dated this 20th day of July, 1938. 
STATE F.ARJ\1: MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE 
INSURAl~CE COJ\IIP ANY. 
By HUGHES, LITTLE & SEA WELL, . 
Its Attorneys. 
Service accepted this 28th day of July, 1938. / 
ANNA L. WRIGHT, 
By CHAS. B. GODWIN, JR., 
Her Attorney. 
page 61 ~ I JUDGE'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, B. D. "'\Vhite, Judge of the Circuit Court of Princess 
Anne County, Virginia, 'vho presided over the foregoing trial 
of the case of Anna. L. Wright v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Company, A Foreign Corporation, in said 
court, at Princess Anne Court House, Virginia, on the 6th 
day of ~July, 1938, do certify that the foregoing is a true and 
correct copy and report of the the testimony and evidence 
introduced upon said trial; all of the instructions offered by 
the parties, including those amended, granted, and refused 
by the Court, 'vith the objections of the parties, the action of 
the Court thereon, and the exceptions of the parties thereto; 
all motions and objections made by the parties at said trial, 
the action of the Court thereon, and the e'xceptions of the 
parties with respect tl1ereto; and all the other incidents of 
the tria] of said case. : · 
I further certify that the original exhibits \introduced in 
evidence upon said trial, to-wit: Plaintiff's Exhibits lettered 
A to H, inclusive, and Defendant's Exhibits ntbnbered 1 and 
2, as mentioned and described in the foregoing~ report, have 
been initialed by me for identification, counsel ~or the parties 
having agreed that said originals should be t:ransmitted to 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia as i~ part of the 
record in t.hi s case, in lieu of certifying coptes thereof to 
said Court. 
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writing, given by counsel for the defendant, of the time and 
place when the foregoing report would be tendered and pre-
sented to me for signature and authentication. 
_ Given under my hand this 1st day of August, 1938, within 
sixty days after the entry of the final judgment in said cause. 
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B. D. WHITE, 
Judge of the Circuit Court of 
Princess Anne County, Virginia. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE. 
I, William F. Hudgins, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Prin-
cess Anne County, Virginia, do certify that the foregoing is 
a true transcript of. the records in t4e case of AnnaL. Wright, 
Plaintiff v. State Farm l\1:utual Automobile Insurance Com-
pany, a foreign corporation, lately pending in said Court. 
I do further certify that the same was not made up, com-
pleted and delivered until the plaintiff had received reason-
able notice thereof, and of the intention of the defendant to 
apply to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia for a 
writ of error to the judgment therein. 
Given under my hand this 17th day of August, 1938. 
WILLIAM F. HUDGINS, 
Clerk of the Circuit .Court of 
Princess Anne County, Virginia. 
A Copy-Teste: 
M. B. WATTS, C. C. 
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